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I 
STATEMEN'I IURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment pursuant !•> Pule 54fh] T'f: h <f 
Rules w - I-'dirinl District 
Court on cross-motion^ l^i ^Uih .1. L.I •*» -; , , rpe^ee DL/LC i"arm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance (Ympany ( Stat* Farm 522-5. 
78-2a-3(j) as a case transferred LO ihis court from the Supreme Court on a duly-
filed notice of appeal. 
n 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1
 1 1 l e • f o l i o IA i 1 lg a 1 e the issue s pi esented foi 1 e i : i. .« :: 
1. Did the trial judge commit reversible error by failing to issue a 
brief statement of the grounds for its decision as required by Rule 52(a), 1 
Rules > i : I CI 1 ill 
Standard of Rev^ .,• Because this issue ^ i l s with the +rin1 court's 
compliance with a provision of »he 1 '->t* R u l o f Civil Procedun it K * 
Insurance Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 
2. Is Metropolitan allowed, pursuant to the Utah Insurance Code, to 
C M l i n i( • III i n l i s HI l n ' t i i u l inn mi Il ,111111 in mi in" 11111 111 " i r l . i l i v i |»>"«^» " N a t i v e s l " l"mi 
their own private passenger automobile, I his provision shall hereinafter 
relencd to as the "resident relative exclusion." (R. 340-384) 
1 
Standard of Review. Because this issue is a question of law and a 
review of summary judgment, the appellate court grants no deference to the 
trial court 's resolution and will review its ruling for correctness. Glover by 
and through Dyson v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996); 
Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1996). 
3. Was the trial court correct in ruling that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact on the issue of whether the non-owned automobile 
driven by defendant Wixom at the time of the accident was available for his 
regular use, thereby making it inappropriate to grant summary judgment. (R. 
405-435) 
Standard of Review. In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court determines whether the trial court was correct in determining 
that there were no disputed issues of fact and gives no deference to the trial 
court's findings. Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996). 
4. Was the trial court correct in ruling that the Utah Insurance Code 
does not allow the "regular use" limitation for non-owned automobiles as 
found in appellant Metropolitan's policy. This provision shall hereinafter be 
referred to as the "regular use exclusion." (R. 405-435) 
Standard of Review. Because this issue is a question of law and a 
review of summary judgment, the appellate court grants no deference to the 
trial court 's resolution and will review its ruling for correctness. Glover by 
and through Dyson v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996); 
Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996). 
2 
5. Was the trial court correct \ 4 tha* — ;;• . i-r 
limita tioi 1 f : ::: 1 1 1 ::: 1 1 o w 1 led c 1 itom ' *• •• 
circurnstaiice and unenforceable against Metropolitans alleged insu io £. 
405-435) 
Slant hit (I nf Remriv, I lit iiiilni prel? J " " ' e« MINIMII 
matter of law for the court, and the appellate coins uill review the trial court's 
decision for correctness. Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 842 P.2d 664 [Utah 19: ,. 
m 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
r
r\*f> «oilowing ar* rules and statutes which are determinative of the 
t p p i . i^p. al : 
1. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent 
part: (a) Effect ., The trial court need not enter findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, 
except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief statement on the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 
50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when the motion is based on 
more than one ground. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-12a-301(2): 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (5): 
(a) e v ei y resident owner of a niotwi vehicle shall 
maintain owner's or operator's security in effect at 
anytime that the motor vrhK,1:~ *~ T.—.5!- rj 
highway within the state; . . . 
(Italics uu~. ^., 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-303U): 
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(1) In addition to complying with the requirements 
of Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of 
motor vehicle liability coverage under subsection 31A-
22-302(l)(a) shall: 
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in 
whose name the policy was purchased, s tate tha t 
named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the 
premium charged, the policy period, and the limits of 
liability; 
(b)(i) if it is an owner's policy, des igna te by 
appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on which 
coverage is granted, insure the person named in the 
policy, insure any other person using any named 
motor vehicle with the express or implied permission 
of the named insured, and, except as provided in 
Subsect ion (7), insure any person included in 
Subsection (l)(c) against loss from the liability 
imposed by law for damages arising out of the 
ownership, main tenance , or u se of these motor 
vehicles within the United States and Canada, subject 
to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for each motor 
vehicle, in amounts not less than the minimum limits 
specified under Section 31A-22-304; or 
(ii) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person 
named as insured against loss from the liability 
imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of 
the insured's use of any motor vehicle not owned by 
him, within the same territorial limits and with the 
same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under 
subsection (l)(b)(i); and 
(c) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure 
person related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are residents 
of the named insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same household 
bu t temporarily live elsewhere to the same extent as 
the named insured. 
4. Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-303(2)(b): 
(2) A policy containing motor vehicle liability 
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a) may: 
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(b) grant any lawful coverage ii 1 additioi i t :: the 
required motor vehicle liability coverage, 
IV 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
with the filing ^ complaint m ihc Seconal ,h: , A District Coua uu r 
about October 12, 1994. : '•• r Wixoi:- \>'"- ' aid State Farm were named as 
( i . . f t - • . r 
plaintiff, ik. I -!j 
2. Otto's complaint sought recovery in- alleged injuries which she 
23 On that date. Ulto collided with an uninsured automwbik- driven by 
Wixom, which was owned by third-parly defendant Laura Yancey ('Yancey"). 
3 . i l l(<*i i 1 . i . \ ' : n 
filed an answer to that amended complaint on -n* airuu August i : 
answer -v^" include" .nmh-> against Metropolitan. 
] V l C L * O p o l i t a i i U a - " " i v . . . ^ , : .* . . St 
15, 1998. (R. 191-208; 2 1 8 - ; . / - j 
4. State Farm asserted in its third party complaint thai Metropolitan 
l i .n l 1111!1, I  In III ' i Il i n d e m n i f y ' W i x o m urn I - " hdh i l i Ly 
policy which it issued io Wixom's parents. Metropolitan hied an answer on 
September 10, ; u " o and denied that it had any e< :y to defend or indemnify 
Wixon -.-.- .- 7) 
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5. On January 24, 1997, Metropolitan filed a summary judgment 
motion asserting that Wixom was not a named insured or a "relative" of his 
parents as the term was defined in the Metropolitan policy and thus would 
not be entitled coverage under that policy. That motion was fully briefed by 
the parties. (R. 340-399; 425-435) 
6. On or about January 27, 1997, State Farm served its own motion 
for summary judgment on its third party complaint against Metropolitan. 
State Farm argued tha t Metropolitan was required to conform to the 
requirements set forth in the s ta tutes and that the Utah Insurance Code 
required coverage for Wixom as a relative of his parents living in their home. 
State Farm also argued that the "regular use" exclusion in the Metropolitan 
policy did not apply because Wixom was not a regular user of the Yancey 
vehicle and that the two exclusions were unenforceable because they were 
vague and ambiguous. (R. 321-339; 458-490) 
7. Metropolitan filed an opposition memorandum which controverted 
the issues raised by State Farm. (R. 405-424) 
8. At a hearing on the cross-motions, held on J u n e 11, 1997, Judge 
Glasmann granted State Farm's motion and denied Metropolitan's motion 
based on the arguments set forth by State Farm (Transcript, p. 31:14-16) and 
a Rule 54 final judgment was entered on July 8, 1997. (R. 522-525) 
9. The order entered by the trial court did not specify the grounds 
upon which the court based its decision. (R. 522-525) 
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10. Metropolitan filed a document entitled Request for Clarification 
On Ruling On Summary Judgment which requested the trial court to clarify 
whether its ruling encompassed the issues relating to the regular use 
exclusion. (R. 517-521) However, the court entered the order without issuing 
a clarification regarding the specific grounds for its order. 
V 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff was allegedly injured on October 23, 1991 when she was 
involved in a collision with Wixom, who was driving Yancey's vehicle (R. 1-4). 
At the time of the accident, Wixom thought that the Yancey vehicle was 
covered by automobile insurance, but later discovered that it was uninsured. 
(R. 350, 379-380) 
2. At the time of the accident, Wixom was 19 years old and living in 
his parents home in Provo. (R. 347, 376-377) Yancey also was living with 
Wixom's parents in their home. (R. 349,377) 
3. When the accident occurred, Wixom was the owner of his own 
automobile, a 1986 Suzuki Samurai. (R. 349, 380-381) Wixom had been 
maintaining his automobile insurance on his vehicle, but had let it lapse two 
weeks prior to the accident. (R. 350, 380-383) During the next two weeks, 
Wixom drove Yancey's vehicle approximately seven times, both with Yancey 
present and for his own purposes. (R. 350, 383-384) 
4. Metropolitan had issued an automobile liability policy to Wixom's 
father which was in place on the date of the accident. The Metropolitan policy 
identified Wixom's father and mother as named insureds. The policy also 
7 
identified two covered vehicles - a 1983 Chevrolet Caprice and a 1989 Suzuki 
Sidekick. (R. 347,357) 
5. The policy defines an insured as follows: 
"insured" means: 
(a) with respect to a covered automobile: 
(i) You; or 
(ii) Any relative; or 
(iii) Any other person using it within the scope of your 
permission; 
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile: 
(i) You; or 
(ii) Any relative b u t only with respect to a private 
passenger automobile, utility automobile, or utility trailer. The 
actual operation or use of such a vehicle must have been with the 
permission of, or reasonably believed to have been with the 
permission of, the owner. The operation or use mus t also have 
been within the scope of the permission given; 
(R. 348, 368) 
6. The policy defines a "relative" as follows: 
"relative" means a person related to you by blood, marriage or 
adoption, and who also resides in your household. Your 
unmarried and unemancipated children, while away from your 
household attending school or in active military service, are 
considered residents of your household. Relative does not include 
any person or the spouse of any person who owns a private 
passenger automobile. 
(R. 348, 368) 
7. The policy defines "covered automobile" as follows: 
"covered automobile" means: 
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(a) Under the Personal Injury Protection, Automobile Liability 
Coverage, and Automobile Medical Expense Coverage sections of 
this policy: 
i an eligible private passenger automobile or utility 
automobile owned by you, or hired under a written contract for 
one year or more, and described in the Declarations, but only with 
respect to coverage for which a specific premium is charged. 
(iv) a substitute automobile. 
(R. 348, 367-368) 
8. The policy defines "non-owned automobile" as follows: 
"non-owned automobile" means an automobile which is neither 
owned by, furnished to, nor made available for regular use to you 
or any resident of your household. This does not include a 
substi tute automobile. A utility trailer when used with a non-
owned automobile is covered except with respect to Section V. 
Physical Damage Coverage. 
(R 349, 368) 
9. The policy defines "substitute automobile" as follows: 
"substitute automobile" means an automobile not owned by you or 
any resident of the same household and which is used with the 
owner's permission to replace for a short time a covered 
automobile. The covered automobile has to be out of use for 
servicing or repair or because of breakdown, loss, or destruction. 
(R. 349, 369) 
VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a trial court to 
issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its decision when a summary 
judgment motion is based on more than one ground. The trial court failed to 
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comply with this requirement as it merely ruled from the bench that it would 
grant State Farm's summary judgment motion and deny Metropolitan's 
summary judgment motion based on the arguments of State Farm. The written 
order entered by the court also failed to identify the grounds for granting the 
motion. Because the court failed in its duty, it is impossible for this court to 
know the trial court's reasoning and the issues on which it felt State Farm 
was entitled to summary judgment. The argument at the hearing focused 
virtually exclusively on whether the resident relative exclusion was allowed 
by the Utah Insurance Code. This failure to identify the bases for the decision 
is reversible error of the trial court if this court holds that the resident relative 
exclusion is unenforceable. Notwithstanding, Metropolitan addresses each of 
the issues argued by State Farm in this brief. 
2. The trial court incorrectly ruled as a matter of law that the Utah 
Insurance Code prohibits Metropolitan from excluding from coverage a relative 
of a named insured, residing in the named insured's home, who owned his 
own automobile and that the code also prohibits Metropolitan from excluding 
from coverage a non-owned automobile available for an insured's regular use. 
Utah Code Annotated section 31A-22-303 sets forth requirements to be found 
in two separate types of automobile liability policies - an owner's policy and 
an operator's policy. There is no requirement that an owner's policy insure 
anyone other than a named insured while driving a vehicle other than those 
vehicles identified on the policy as covered vehicles. Therefore, the exclusions 
are not prohibited by the Insurance Code. 
10 
3. The trial court incorrectly ruled as a matter of law tha t the 
resident relative exclusion and the regular use exclusion are vague and 
ambiguous. Pursuant to the accepted rules of construction of language in an 
insurance policy, the resident relative exclusion and regular use exclusion are 
clear and unambiguous and enforceable against Wixom for the plaintiffs 
claims. The language contained in the policy is plain to a person of ordinary 
intelligence and understanding, and under any definition of the terms, would 
apply to bar coverage to Wixom. 
4. The trial court was incorrect in ruling as a matter of law that 
Wixom's use of Yancey's vehicle was not "regular", thereby bringing Wixom 
within the coverage of Metropolitan's policy. For the two weeks prior to the 
accident, Wixom regularly, systematically and with permission used Yancey's 
vehicle, both with her present and for his own purposes. Such use as a matter 
of law is a regular use of the Yancey vehicle. 
vn 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ISSUE A BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF 
THE GROUNDS FOR ITS DECISION IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the a trial court to 
issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its decision on a summary 
judgment motion if the motion is based on more than one ground. Each of the 
issues discussed below, were asserted by State Farm and /or Metropolitan in 
the trial court on their motions for summary judgment. The hearing on the 
motions focused virtually exclusively on whether the resident relative 
11 
exclusion, which is discussed below, was in violation of the Utah Insurance 
Code so that Wixom would have coverage for the use of Yancey's vehicle. See 
Transcript attached as Addendum 1. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
trial court indicated that it was "going to deny Metropolitan's motion and 
grant State Farm's based on the arguments made by State Farm." (Transcript, 
p. 31:14-16.) The formal order entered by the court, which was prepared by 
State Farm, stated that the motion was granted for the reasons set forth in 
State Farm's memoranda. (R. 524) 
In Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 839 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1992), the trial judge likewise failed to issue a brief written statement of 
the grounds for his decision and likewise indicated that he was granting the 
motion as set forth in the defendant's arguments. Although the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the ruling in that case was not reversible error because it did 
not constitute unusua l circumstances, it did discuss the reasons for the 
requirement that a brief written statement be issued. It held: 
Clearly, the trial judge did not comply with the requirements of 
rule 52(a). We recently added the final sentence to rule 52(a) to 
aid our review of summary judgments in which the parties had 
advanced a number of alternative grounds; otherwise, we could 
not identify the basis for a trial judge's ruling. When reviewing 
trial court decisions, we presume them to be correct and search for 
grounds upon which they may be upheld. [Citation.] As a 
practical matter, however, that presumption has little operative 
effect when members of this court cannot divine the trial court's 
r eason ing because of the cryptic n a t u r e of i ts ru l ing. 
Consequently, both the interest of the trial court in having a 
correct ruling sustained and the interest of the parties in having a 
properly framed appellate proceeding are better served when the 
trial court complies with rule 52(a). 
Id. at 800. 
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In the ins tant case, if this court finds tha t the resident relative 
exclusion is valid and enforceable, there would be no reason to reverse the 
trial court and send it back for a determination of the specific grounds on 
which State Farm's motion was granted because this would provide an 
independent basis for Metropolitan's denial of coverage to Wixom. However, 
because the regular use exclusion was not addressed by the parties at the 
hearing, it is unclear whether that was intended to be a basis for the court's 
decision, and it is unclear whether the court actually determined whether 
Wixom's use of the vehicle was not regular. Accordingly, if those issues are 
necessary for a determination of this appeal, the case should be remanded to 
the trial court. 
B. THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESIDENT RELATIVE 
O F THE NAMED INSURED TO B E COVERED BY THE NAMED INSURED'S POLICY AND 
DOES NOT PROHIBIT AN EXCLUSION FOR VEHICLES AVAILABLE FOR THE REGULAR 
USE OF AN INSURED. 
L The Resident Relative Exclusion. 
The trial court in this case incorrectly ruled that the Utah Insurance 
Code prohibited Metropolitan from including the resident relative exclusion in 
its policy. Because this ruling of the trial court was a question of law, this 
court grants no deference to the trial court's resolution of the issue and is to 
review the ruling for correctness. Glover by and through Dyson v. Boy Scouts 
of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996). 
Coverage under the Metropolitan policy is dependent on the nature of 
Yancey's vehicle and how it is defined in the policy. Because Wixom was not 
driving an automobile which was identified in the Metropolitan policy, he was 
13 
not driving a covered automobile, nor was he driving a substi tute automobile. 
Wixom's use of Yancey's vehicle was a use of a "non-owned automobile" as 
that term was defined in the policy. 
The Metropolitan policy extends coverage for use of a non-owned 
automobile to the named insured or any relative of the named insured. It 
defines "relative" as a person related to the named insured by "blood, marriage 
or adoption, and who also resides in your household." There is no dispute 
that at the time of the accident Wixom was living in his parents ' household. 
However, the definition of "relative" in the policy concludes with an 
exclusionary provision that excepts from the definition "any person or the 
spouse of any person who owns a private passenger automobile." 
A similar provision was addressed in Bain v. Gleason, 726 P.2d 1153 
(Mont. 1986). In that case, the policy issued to a father defined "relative" as "a 
relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household, 
provided neither such relative nor his spouse owns an automobile." Id. at 
1159. The Montana Supreme Court held that a son did not have coverage 
under policies issued to the father because the son's ownership of his own 
vehicle excepted him from the definition of "relative" under the policy. Id. 
Likewise, in this case, Wixom is not a relative as that term is defined in the 
Metropolitan policy because it is undisputed that at the time of the accident 
he owned his own motor vehicle. 
In the trial court, State Farm argued in opposition to Metropolitan's 
summary judgment motion, and in support of its own summary judgment 
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motion, that the Utah Insurance Code does not allow the resident relative 
exclusion. However, a careful reading of the Utah Insurance Code reveals that 
there is nothing in the code that prohibits this particular policy exclusion. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-12a-301(2)(a) requires every resident owner 
of a motor vehicle to have either an owner's or an operator's policy in effect at 
anytime the motor vehicle is operated within the state. It is important to note 
that this section does not require an owner of a motor vehicle to maintain 
both owner's and operator's coverage, but only requires either of the two types 
of coverages. 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-303 sets forth the required elements to 
be found in owner's policies and in operator's policies. The required coverages 
are not the same for the two policies. Subsection (l)(a) requires that either 
type of policy identify the name of the person who purchased the policy, 
identify the named insured's address, the coverage under the policy, the 
premium charged for the policy, the policy period and the limits of liability 
unde r the policy. Subsect ion (l)(b)(i) then sets forth the additional 
requirements for an owner's policy and Subsection (l)(b)(ii) sets forth the 
requirements for an operator's policy. 
The only requirements mandated by Subsection (l)(b)(i) for an owner's 
policy are: (a) that it shall designate all motor vehicles on which coverage is 
granted; (b) that it insure the person named and all other permissive users 
using the identified motor vehicles; and (c) that it shall insure all persons 
under (l)(c) using the specific motor vehicles identified in the policy within 
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the United States and Canada. Subsection (l)(c) requires that coverage be 
provided in an owner's policy and in an operator's policy for persons related to 
the named insured and who are residents of his household to the same extent 
as required for the named insured. It is important to note that there is no 
requirement that an owner's policy provide coverage to its insured for liability 
while driving a vehicle owned by any other person. 
The only requirement of an operator's policy set forth in Subsection 
(l)(b)(ii) is that it provide the insured with coverage for the use of any motor 
vehicle not owned by him. 
Utah Code Annotated section 31A-22-303(2)(b) allows Metropolitan to 
provide coverage in excess of that required by statute. 
The Metropolitan policy contains all the indicia of an owner's policy. 
The declaration sheet identifies the vehicles insure 4 under the policy and 
shows the premium changed for each vehicle coverage. There is no premium 
charged, on the other hand, for the named insureds on the policy. (R. 347) 
Metropolitan's owner's policy issued to Wixom's father did provide coverages 
in excess of that required by the Utah Insurance Code. It provided "omnibus" 
coverage to the named insured and certain of his relatives while driving 
vehicles not owned by them. Metropolitan was not required to place the 
coverage in the policy and it had the right to restrict the extra coverage in any 
manner it desired. It did so by denying coverage to a relative of the named 
insured who owned his own vehicle. 
16 
The purpose for this restriction is logical. It protects Metropolitan from 
the situation, for example, in which parents may have several children living 
at home, and all of the children own their own vehicles. Because premiums 
are charged to an insured based on risk, an owner's policy identifies specific 
vehicles covered by the policy and which are required to be covered when 
being driven by the named insured or others with his permission. An 
insurance company, however, cannot be required to provide coverage for each 
of the sons and their own vehicles under the owner's policy, unless the 
vehicles are specifically identified as covered and a premium charged. 
Otherwise, Metropolitan would be forced to provide coverage for not only the 
vehicles that have been identified, but any number of additional vehicles 
owned by resident relatives of the household. Public policy would not impose 
this burden on the insurer which could lead to exposure to the company in 
excess of that contemplated by the premium charged for the policy. 
In Grange Insurance Association v. MacKenzie, 694 P.2d 1087 (Wash. 
1985), the Washington Supreme Court held that the purpose of a regular use 
exclusion in a policy was to protect an insured from exposure beyond that 
contemplated by the policy. It held: 
An insurance company's legitimate interest is in preventing an 
increase in the quantum of risk without a corresponding increase 
in the premium; the risk to the insurance company is related only 
to the amount of time the car is driven, not to the reason that car 
is driven. [Citation] 
An examination of the purposes of the "use of other automobiles" 
clauses supports the analysis and result reached in this case. The 
purposes of these clauses have been described as twofold: 
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(1) to prevent an insured from receiving coverage on 
all household cars or another uninsured car of the 
insured by merely purchasing a single policy, and (2) 
to provide coverage to the insured when engaged in 
the infrequent use of non-owned vehicles. 
[Citation] Thus, the purpose of these provisions is to provide 
coverage for isolated use without the payment of an additional 
premium, but to disallow the interchangeable use of other cars 
which are not covered by the policy. 
Id at 1089-1090. 
In the instant case, Metropolitan has the legitimate interest in making 
sure that it is receiving a premium for all of the risk that it is insuring under 
the policy. Because premiums are changed for identified cars, there would be 
no obligation on Metropolitan to provide coverage for a vehicle owned by a 
resident relative of the named insured, unless that vehicle were identified on 
the policy and a separate premium charged. 
State Farm argued that the Metropolitan policy was both an owner's 
and an operator's policy and therefore was required to maintain the coverages 
required for both types of policies. However, there is no support in the record 
for this contention by State Farm. As argued above, the Metropolitan policy 
has all of the earmarks of an owner's policy. The covered vehicles under the 
policy are identified and a premium charged for them. 
In Dairyland Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 882 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court was required to 
interpret a State Farm policy which was similar to the coverage provided by 
the Metropolitan policy in the instant case, except it did not contain the 
resident relative exclusion in its definition of relative. The issue decided by 
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the Utah Supreme Court was whether a relative excluded from coverage by an 
endorsement authorized by section 31A-22-303(7) could otherwise qualify as a 
permissive user of an insured vehicle. In performing its analysis, the Utah 
Supreme Court analyzed the policy as an owner's policy pursuant to section 
303(l)(b)(i). Id. at 1145-1146. Likewise, the Metropolitan policy at issue herein 
is properly analyzed as an owner's policy and does not require Metropolitan to 
provide coverage to Wixom. 
If this court feels that a determination of the Metropolitan policy as 
either an owner's or operator's this is necessary, it is a factual issue that 
should be resolved by a remand to the trial court. 
2. The Regular Use Exclusion. 
The trial court also may have incorrectly ruled tha t the regular use 
exclusion of the policy was barred as violating the required coverages of the 
Utah Insurance Code. The same analysis that was discussed above for the 
resident relative exclusion is also applicable to the resolution of this issue. 
Metropolitan is not required in an owner's policy to extend coverage for use of 
a vehicle by anyone other than the named insured of any motor vehicle other 
than those identified as covered vehicles in the policy. Thus, Metropolitan 
was allowed to exclude from coverage non-owned vehicles available for the 
regular use of an omnibus insured under the policy. 
C. THE RESIDENT RELATIVE AND REGULAR USE EXCLUSIONS ARE NOT 
AMBIGUOUS. 
L Standards for Interpretation of Insurance Policies. 
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The trial court may have ruled that the resident relative exclusion and 
the regular use exclusion were ambiguous and unenforceable. As will be 
shown below, no ambiguity exists in the Metropolitan policy. This is an issue 
of law and this court reviews the decision of the trial court for correctness. 
In Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the basic principles upon which this court mus t rely in interpreting 
the language of Metropolitan's policy. 
Generally, the interpretation of insurance policy language presents 
a question of law to be decided by the trial judge using accepted 
methods of construction. Specifically, the terms of insurance 
contracts , as well as all contracts , are to be interpreted in 
accordance with their usually accepted meanings and should be 
read as a whole, in an attempt to harmonize and give effect to all 
of the contract provisions. To protect against overreaching 
insurers and because courts construe contracts against their 
drafters, ambiguities in the policy are resolved in favor of 
coverage. Policy language is ambiguous if it is not " 'plain to a 
person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the 
matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and 
na tu ra l meaning of the words, and in the light of existing 
circumstances, including the purpose of the policy.' " 
Id. at 665-666 (quoting LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 
857, 858 (Utah 1988)) Thus, this court must look to language of the exclusions 
and make a determination of whether it is understandable to a layman of 
ordinary intelligence and understanding. 
2. Resident Relative Exclusion. 
A review of the policy definition of relative leads to the unmistakable 
conclusion that the policy provision is clear and unambiguous and enforceable 
on its face. This issue was addressed by the Montana Supreme Court in Bain 
v. Gleason, supra, 726 P.2d at 1153. In that case, the policy defined relative as 
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a "relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household, 
provided neither such relative nor his spouse owns an automobile." Id. at 
1159. It also defined non-owned automobile as an automobile which was "not 
owned by or regularly or frequently used by the named insured or any 
resident of the same household . . ." Id. Based on these policy provisions, 
which are similar to those of the Metropolitan policy, the court found that the 
language could not be construed in any way other than excluding coverage 
for the insured's son because he owned his own automobile. Id. at 1159-1160. 
This is likewise t rue with regard to the definition of relative in the 
Metropolitan policy. The definition of relative leaves no doubt as to its 
meaning and effect. It does not include a relative who owns his own 
automobile. The other reasonable interpretation can be given to the language. 
3. Regular Use Exclusion. 
In Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 
254 (Utah App. 1988), this court considered the applicability of a regular use 
exclusion that is virtually the same as in this Metropolitan policy. In that 
case, the Metropolitan policyholder was involved in an accident while driving 
an employer-owned pick-up truck. The insured was allowed to keep the truck 
at his home during non-business hours and utilize it in his commute to and 
from work. Personal use of the vehicle required the consent of the employer. 
The accident occurred while the insured was traveling home from work after 
stopping at a bar and consuming alcohol. The parties in Finlayson offered 
different definitions of "regular use," each of which were determined to be 
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plausible. Id. at 258. In reaching this decision, this court noted that cases 
from other jurisdictions supported each party's assert ions regarding the 
definition of "regular use." Based thereon, the regular use exception to the 
definition of a non-owned automobile was found to be vague and ambiguous 
and strictly construed against Metropolitan. Id. 
The holding in Finlayson does not lead to a similar holding in this case, 
as under either definition advanced by the parties in Finlayson, there would 
not be any coverage for Wixom. In Finlayson, the policyholder argued that 
"regular use" meant a "use which is consistent with a pattern or prescribed 
course of conduct or dealing." Id. at 255. He argued that since the truck was 
in his possession for use in his employment, his use of the truck in going to 
and from the bar was a deviation from his authorized use and it could not 
therefore be a "regular" use. Id. Metropolitan argued, to the contrary, that 
regular use meant "frequent or continuous use" and emphasized the control 
Finlayson had over the vehicle. Id. a t 256. Under th is definition, 
Metropolitan argued that because the insured was in actual possession of the 
vehicle and used it on a daily basis for his employment, his use was regular 
regardless of the actual purpose of use at the time of the accident. 
In the instant case, the undisputed material facts show that for at least 
a two week period prior to the accident, Wixom's use of Yancey's vehicle was 
regular under either of the definitions. Wixom testified in his deposition that 
during that time period, he used the vehicle both in conjunction with Yancey, 
and for his own personal needs. At the time the accident occurred, his use 
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was authorized by Yancey and was consistent with his pattern or course of 
conduct in using the vehicle. Moreover, the facts show that during the two 
week period, Wixom's use of the vehicle was frequent as he drove the vehicle 
on more than seven occasions, both for personal errands and in conjunction 
with his relationship with Yancey. (R. 380-384) Thus, based on these facts, 
the regular use exception is not vague and ambiguous and even a strict 
construction of the term against Metropolitan leads to the conclusion that 
there is no coverage for Wixom's use of Yancey's vehicle. If the court ruled 
that the use was not regular, tha t ruling was in error as the facts show 
otherwise. The fact that the use had only gone on for two weeks is irrelevant 
if the use was regular for that time period. 
The case of Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Hoverter, 829 P.2d 
783 (Wash. App. 1992), is illustrative of how particular facts can lead to 
differing conclusions on whether the regular use exclusion is clear and 
unambiguous. In that case, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the 
definition of non-owned car, which excepted from the definition a car that was 
furnished for the regular or frequent use of the insured, and a similar 
exclusion from coverage for vehicles available for the regular use of an insured, 
were both clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claim against 
the son of the named insured. The named insured's son was driving a vehicle 
which the named insured's father had provided to him for use by the family 
when their cars were not working. The court held that the definition and 
exclusion were clear and unambiguous and held that the use of the vehicle 
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was "systematic" and came within the definition and exclusion under any 
definition. Id. at 786. 
In reaching its conclusion in the case, the court distinguished the case 
of Palmer v. Glen Falls Insurance Co., 360 P.2d 742 (Wash. 1961). In Palmer, 
the insured had borrowed a car from his son-in-law, and for two months had 
used it regularly for his business. On the day of the accident, the son-in-law 
instructed the insured to take the vehicle to a specific repair shop for service. 
The insured was involved in an accident while driving to the shop. The 
insured's personal policy contained an exclusion for use of an automobile that 
was furnished for the regular use of the insured. 
The Washington Supreme Court in Palmer accepted the insurer's theory 
that its insured's use of the automobile in his business qualified as a regular 
use which came within the exclusion to the policy and also tha t things 
necessarily incident to the operation of an automobile are also incident to the 
business and are therefore a regular use. Id. at 743. However, the court also 
reasoned that the trip to the repair shop was a "special use" which was not 
within the "regular use" of the vehicle by the insured. Based thereon, the 
court held that the exclusion did not bar coverage under the policy. Id. 
Based on the holding of the Palmer case, the Washington Court of 
Appeals in Hoverter held that the insured's use of the car was authorized 
whenever other cars were not working properly and thus it was a consistent 
and regular use. Based thereon, the Washington Court of Appeals held that 
Palmer was distinguishable. 
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Likewise, in the instant case, Finlayson does not control because under 
any definition set forth by the parties, there would be no coverage for Wixom 
as his use was regular, systematic and expected. Wixom's was not a special 
use as was the insured's use in Finlayson and is therefore excluded from 
coverage. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Metropolitan respectfully requests this court to overrule the 
decision of the Second Judicial District Court and rule that as a matter of law 
the resident relative and regular use exclusions are not in violation of the 
Utah Insurance Code, and that they clearly and unambiguously apply to deny 
coverage for Wixom in this case. Additionally, if the court rules that the 
resident relative exclusion violates the Utah Insurance Code, the case should 
be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the basis upon which it 
grants State Farm's motion, unless the court otherwise rules that the trial 
court was incorrect if it, in fact, ruled on any of the other grounds for the 
motion. 
DATED this of February, 1998. 
DUNN & DUNN 
CARLTON R. ERICSON 
Attorney for Appellant Metropolitan 
Property & Casualty Insurance 
Company 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
AMY (ECHARD) OTTO, 
Case No. 940900473 
Plaintiff 
TRANCRIPT ON APPEAL 
-vs-
THOR Y. WIXOM and STATE 
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came on 
for hearing before the Hon. MICHAEL J. GLASMANN, Judge of the 
above entitled Court on June 11, 1997. 
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had and the 
following testimony was adduced, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e s : 
ERIC K. DAVENPORT, ESQ., 
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiff; 
CARLTON R. ERICSON, ESQ., 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant. 
THE COURT: The next item is Otto vs. Wixom, case 
0473. 
Counselors, just before we launch into your argument, 
there have been some people show up that were misinformed wher] 
they were to be here, and I am going to have to let them know 
that we are not going to hear from them today. While we are 
waiting for them to come in, this is the time set for oral 
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I have a sheet here on the parties' lineup. Actually we 
have cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. We have 
Metropolitan's Motion for Summary Judgment and State Farm's 
Motion for Summary Judgement. Do you have any agreement as tcj 
who is going to go first? 
THE BAILIFF: She must have left. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Barry. 
MR. DAVENPORT: I know Carlton filed his first, if 
he wants to go first, I have no problem. I will be happy to 
go first if he prefers I do. 
MR. ERICSON: I can go first. 
THE COURT: Jump in. We will have you go first. 
MR. ERICSON: All right. Your Honor, this is--I am 
Carlton Ericson on behalf of Metropolitan Insurance Company. 
As you know, this case has been long, involved, and 
essentially comes down to a dispute between two insurance 
companies over who has--over whether Metropolitan has the dut^ 
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to defend and indemnify Thor Wixom on the claim brought 
against him by Amy Otto for an accident that occurred when Mr 
Wixom was driving a vehicle owned by Laura Yancy. 
Now Metropolitan had issued an automobile liability 
policy to Thor's father, Douglas Wixom. That policy listed 
certain vehicles covered under the policy, vehicles owned by 
Mr. and Mrs. Wixom. Now Thor was also the owner of a vehicle.; 
And he had had it insured through another insurance company. 
Unfortunately, two weeks before the accident happened, he let 
his insurance lapse. And he did not drive his vehicle for th^ 
next two weeks. He also did not drive his parents' vehicle 
during those two weeks. But instead, if he had to drive, he 
would go out with Laura, who was his sort of fiancee, and was 
also living in a room at Thor's parents' house. He thought 
this was okay, because he had seen Laura pay some premiums on 
her automobile insurance. But unfortunately, hers had also 
lapsed prior to the accident. 
Now for purposes of this Motion, we really don't dispute 
that Thor was living at his parents' house at the time of the 
accident. And as such, he would be considered a resident of 
their household. Also for purposes of the Motion, we have no 
dispute that insurance companies are required to provide 
whatever statutory coverage is mandated by law. So I guess 
the issue comes down to what is really mandated by law in this| 
case. 
Section 41-12a-301 of the Motor Vehicle Code, every 
resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain owner's or 
operator's security in effect. That is either owner's or 
operator's security. State Farm, in their memorandum, talks 
about it--in quoting the section, talks about it being owners 
and operators. That is not the language of the statute. The 
statute requires owners coverage or operator's coverage. 
And then we need to look to 31a-22-303 to determine what 
coverages are required in either one of those two types of 
policies. 303 requires that every policy shall designate the 
owner or the operator who purchased the policy, the address oj^  
that owner of the policy, the coverages afforded, the premium 
charges, the policy period and the limits. Now, that's 
required in any policy regardless of whether or not it is an 
owner's or operator's policy. 
303(1) (b) (i) sets out what's required if it is an owner' s| 
policy. It has to designate all motor vehicles brought under 
the policy. It has to insure the named insured. It has to 
insure anyone else using a named motor vehicle. And then, as 
kind of a redundant item, states it must insure all relatives 
in the household of the named insured while using the named 
vehicle. Actually it says these motor vehicles, it doesn't 
say the named motor vehicle, but referring to those identified 
in the policy. And that is all that is required in an owner's) 
policy. And if that's all the policy had, it would fully 
comply with the requirements of Utah law for an owner's 
policy. 
Now in sub-subsection little 2 or double i, that sets outj 
the requirements for an operator's policy. Now an operator's 
policy is a particular beast that can be sold by insurance 
companies. It is rarely sold any more. But for example, you 
or I could go to the insurance company, say we don't even own 
a vehicle, and we could say we want to have an operator's 
policy that would make sure we were covered whenever we drove 
someone else's vehicle. 
THE COURT: Any vehicle? 
MR. ERICSON: Any vehicle. So under this 
requirement if you buy an operator's policy, like I say rarel^j 
sold in the State of Utah any more, it requires coverage for 
the operator or for the owner for any non-owned vehicle that 
he drives. 
Now then going down to subsection (c), (1)(c), it then 
states that relatives in the same household of a named insured} 
need to be also covered by the named insured's policies. 
THE COURT: And that would be true even of an 
operator's policy? 
MR. ERICSON: Yes. Yes. 
THE COURT: Now, when we say needs to be, I am 
asking maybe a dumb question so I get this clear in my mind. 
If I am taking out an owner's policy, and they ask me who is 
living in my home, I say no one, I am living by myself, and it] 
is not true, is the insurance company still on the hook for 
the people that were living in the house? Or are they off th4 
hook then because they base their premium on their exposure, 
if you will? 
MR. ERICSON: They do base the premium on their 
exposure. And in that situation I think there are other 
things about fraud--
THE COURT: Non-disclosure. 
MR. ERICSON: Right. 
THE COURT: What we are saying is the insurance cod^ 
that you are citing from here is saying as a matter of policy 
we are going to require that when you have someone living in 
your home that we are going to include you if it is an owner'^ 
policy. 
MR. ERICSON: Right. 
THE COURT: Or if it is an operator's policy, we arej 
going to include those people living in your home? 
MR. ERICSON: That's correct, if they are relatives, 
related by blood, that type of thing. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, go ahead. 
MR. ERICSON: Now Metropolitan's policy complies 
with that. It does insure for relatives in the same household} 
as required by statute. However, the policy then excludes 
from the definition of relative someone who owns his own 
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vehicle. 
Now that makes some sense because someone who owns his 
own vehicle is also required by the Code to have his own 
insurance on that vehicle. And if the relative, a son in thi^ 
case, wants that vehicle to be covered under the named 
insured's policy, then he can disclose that to the insurance 
company and have that also covered. And so it makes sense 
that insurance companies do not have to cover carte blanche 
every vehicle owned by every relative who lives in that 
household. 
For example, let's take the situation where there is a 
family with four children. All of them have driver's 
licenses. Let's say one or two of them are in college. And 
one or two of them still in high school. But they all own 
their own vehicles. Now, in that situation, it does not make 
sense, and I don't see anything in the Code that would require) 
an insurance company to provide coverage, liability coverage, 
for every one of those individuals while they are driving the 
vehicles that they own. They are not disclosed to the 
insurance company. They are an additional risk that the 
insurance company doesn't know about. And the insurance 
company plainly and simply should not be required to have to 
provide liability coverage for those risks that it knows 
nothing about. 
THE COURT: I want to ask a question to clarify thisl 
further. 
MR. ERICSON: All right. 
THE COURT: If those--instead of getting into four 
kids, let's say we have got two. 
MR. ERICSON: All right, two. 
THE COURT: We will say that one of the two has his 
own vehicle, and has a separate policy on it. 
MR. ERICSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. And we will say that's not 
disclosed to the insurance company. But the insurance company 
is aware that the two children are there in the home, okay. 
Now if that child does not drive his own--this is probably the| 
$64,000.00 question. But if that child does not drive his 
vehicle that he has insured, but say drives an uncle's vehicld 
or whatever, and it turns out there is no insurance on it, anq 
an accident happens, the dispute here as I understand it is 
that our state law appears to say that when there is an 
owner's policy that runs to that head of household, that it 
has to cover those relatives as defined that are living in the) 
household. 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: And your company's particular insurance 
policy says if there is someone living in that household who 
has their own vehicle and their own insurance on that 
vehicle--
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: That we are not going to cover it? 
MR. ERICSON: Not if you don't have your own 
insurance. Strike out that part. 
THE COURT: If they have got their own vehicle? 
MR. ERICSON: They are not going to the extent of 
saying you have your own vehicle and your own insurance. You 
have your own vehicle, regardless if it is an antique. 
THE COURT: And that vehicle is not included in the 
insurance? 
MR. ERICSON: Or any insurance, correct. Now we 
have, for example, here--this is not a vehicle that was, you 
know, just a junk car that was sitting there and never moved. 
THE COURT: You are anticipating the argument. 
MR. ERICSON: Right. This was a vehicle--he decide^ 
he was going to sell it. I can't remember what year it was. 
It wasn't an old vehicle. He let the insurance lapse a couple] 
of weeks before this accident happened. And it was still 
registered. And if--and it was required by law to have 
insurance by 41-12A-301. If you own a motor vehicle, you have] 
to have owner's or operator's insurance. 
So there you come down to, well, this is all well and 
good, you know, it is very admirable that insurance companies 
need to insure these relatives that live in their household 
because they are protected in that situation where you have 
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someone living there and they are driving mom and dad's car 
all the time and what have you. And so, yeah, we need to hav^ 
them covered. 
But we have the situation here where first of all for an 
owner's policy, it does not need to extend coverage while you 
are driving someone else's car. All it talks about is you ard 
going to have coverage for those people while they are driving 
one of the vehicles listed in the policy. And so in essence 
what it comes down to is a question in many ways of whether 01} 
not this is an owner's or operator's policy. Because an 
owner's policy that is not required to extend coverage when 
you are driving someone else's vehicle is allowed. 
Insurance companies--and we stated the statute. I don't 
have it right in front of me. You can then provide coverage 
greater than that mandated by statute. And so Metropolitan's 
position is that this in fact is an owner's policy that has 
coverage greater than that mandated by statute. It is not an 
operator's policy. An operator's policy is a different animal] 
that can be purchased by someone to cover him even if he 
doesn't own a vehicle. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this question, though. If--
and the statement may have gotten me confused here. If we 
take the position and accept the notion that it is an owner's 
policy. So let's say that this driver doesn't have--the chilcj 
involved here doesn't have his own vehicle. 
id 
MR. ERICSON: All right. 
THE COURT: In this case he is out driving the 
girlfriend's vehicle. 
MR. ERICSON: Let's say he sold the vehicle the day 
before, his own. 
THE COURT: Let's say he never had it, and he is 
driving the girlfriend's vehicle. 
MR. ERICSON: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: First of all let's take the State law. 
You agree our State law would mandate the insurance involved 
here cover him? 
MR. ERICSON: Yes, to the extent that--well, the 
policy is written so that it would extend to him. 
THE COURT: The policy in fact does. I am asking dc| 
you agree the State law would require it? 
MR. ERICSON: It would not require it. It would 
allow it to be put in the policy if it is an owner's policy. 
Now if it is an operator's policy, then the State law would 
require it. 
THE COURT: I though you were just telling me even 
under an owner's policy--wait a minute now, we need to back up| 
a whole another step. Let's eliminate the children from the 
picture. We have an owner, and the owner has a policy that 
covers the vehicle he listed. 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
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THE COURT: And that owner one day has a friend who 
asks him to drive her car? 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Because she is sick. 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: He is driving her car. Doesn't know it 
is not insured. Gets in an accident. 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: I would assume that his owner's policy 
would cover him driving that non-owned vehicle. 
MR. ERICSON: As a practical matter, yes. But undeij 
the statute--
MR. DAVENPORT: You add another car not insured. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. ERICSON: Okay. According to your hypothetical 
here, he has a policy. It lists two vehicles that he owns. 
He goes out and he is driving a friend's vehicle that is 
uninsured. As a practical matter, he would be covered by his 
insurance because you read most of the insurance policies and 
they cover driving non-owned vehicles. But under--
THE COURT: You are saying they don't have to. 
MR. ERICSON: They don't have to under 303(1) (b) (i) 
It says if it is an owner's policy it has to insure the person! 
named in the policy, insure any other person using any named--| 
named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of 
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the named insured. And except as provided in subsection 7, 
insure any person included in subsection (1)(c), which are 
relatives of the named insured, against loss from the 
liabilities imposed by law for damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of these motor vehicles. These 
motor vehicles meaning the named motor vehicles in the policy 
So that is all that is required in an owner's policy. Scj 
under State law your hypothetical is the insurance company 
would not be required to provide him coverage in that 
situation. As a practical matter the insurance companies hav^ 
expanded the coverage of owner's policies, and do include 
that. But they are not required to. 
THE COURT: I understand, counsel, as you argue this) 
to me, I think breaking it down between the policy on the one 
hand the what the State law mandates is the tracks I have to 
keep it in. 
MR. ERICSON: Right. 
THE COURT: So what your argument is, your argument 
is at least that the State law does not mandate that an 
owner's policy cover the insured driving someone else's 
vehicle. 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: That because of that--
MR. ERICSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: That even though relatives have to be 
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included, that then if we include the relatives under the 
umbrella, then also by analogy that does not mandate that a 
relative be covered under an owner's policy driving a non-
owned vehicle? 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Stranger vehicle? 
MR. ERICSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: So then what you are saying is your 
argument is because the State law doesn't mandate that, it is 
within the right of Metropolitan writing a policy in the State) 
of Utah to say that if you have got someone living in your 
house who owns their own vehicle, and I will get back to you 
in a minute, but we don't insure that person under the owner'^ 
policy? 
MR. ERICSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now then, even though within your] 
policy if your actual insured is out driving the third party 
car, it would insure that person for liability? 
MR. ERICSON: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: So now we get the son who is out driving! 
the third party's vehicle, and even though under the relatives] 
provision he normally would be covered, it is this exclusion 
for his having his own car that you are hoping to hang your 
hat on? 
MR. ERICSON: No, Metropolitan has the right to 
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restrict their insurance of a relative there. 
THE COURT: Your restriction doesn't point at what 
actually happened in this case. In other words, it doesn't--
your restriction doesn't go out and say that relative, who ar^ 
in this case driving a stranger's vehicle, is going to be 
excluded. That's not what it is pointing at. It stops at th^ 
level of saying he owns his own car and therefore is excluded 
As I understand, the argument from the other side is that] 
that exclusion that you are attempting to rely on is not 
lawful under Utah law. 
MR. DAVENPORT: That's part of the argument, yes. 
MR. ERICSON: And so what--
THE COURT: This is a fascinating argument. 
MR. ERICSON: What we are saying is because there i^ 
nothing to mandate, you know, coverage for those non-owned 
vehicles in the owner's policy, then Metropolitan can deal 
with it like they want. 
But also--and here is the other part. But also because 
Thor owned his own vehicle, that was not identified as one of 
the vehicles in the owner's policy, see, then he shouldn't be 
covered under the policy because he has his own duty to have 
his own insurance on his own vehicle. In effect he recognized 
that. He had his own insurance on his own vehicle. He let it) 
lapse. But that shouldn't change the status and the risk to 
Metropolitan. 
15I 
Now, he said I didn't drive my vehicle for a couple of 
weeks. But that doesn't change the fact that he could have 
picked up the keys at any time and driven out of the driveway 
and driven that vehicle. It was registered. If someone came 
over to test drive it, he could have gone out with that persorj 
on a test drive. And it needed to be insured. 
So there are like two or three different levels here of 
what we have to look at. And there is admittedly no clear, 
you know, statute that says, okay, in this situation this is 
how we deal with it. And so we have to read into some of the 
statutes what is trying to be accomplished by the statutes. 
And so that in essence is our position. 
Now, I will let Mr. Davenport get up and explain his 
position. I am sure we can go back and forth all afternoon. 
I think you understand the issues we are facing. 
THE COURT: I will try to avoid doing that. I think) 
it would be helpful to hear from Mr. Davenport. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Your Honor, contrary to Mr. 
Ericson's indications, it is our position that there is 
statutory law and case law directly on point which governs 
this issue. This isn't an issue that hasn't been already 
addressed by appellate courts. In fact, I have obtained 
rulings from trial courts in my favor. 
MR. ERICSON: I object, that's irrelevant. 
MR. DAVENPORT: But let me walk through this with 
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you to make sure you understand really what is at issue and 
what isn't. 
First, Metropolitan has admitted that, although they tooJ{ 
the other position in their opposing memorandum, that it is 
the statutes that govern. Now they have indicated that I 
cited certain cases in my initial supporting memorandum. That] 
I used the term "and" instead of "or" when I referred to 
owner's or operator's security requirements. I did not. In 
fact it is on page 8 where I quote the actual statute. I 
quote it correctly. I said, in quoting the statute I cite, 
every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased} 
to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement, 
the section--blah, blah, blah. Let's get that clear. 
You know, there is not a dispute here as to what the 
statutes say. And I am not trying--
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DAVENPORT: There was an indication somewhere 
else obviously was a typo, obviously, where it says owner's or| 
operator's, on a number of occasions. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ECHARD: That's rare. 
THE COURT: Just go ahead. 
MR. DAVENPORT: That's not the key issue here. The 
key issue is that the Metropolitan policy is, in addition to 
an owner's policy, is an operator's policy. You have to 
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understand, your Honor, that other courts have found this. 
The Utah court in Barber found this. What insurance companie^ 
have done under the circumstances is issued a combined policy 
They do it in many different ways in other types of policies. 
They will put different types of coverages under one policy. 
That is what occurred with the Metropolitan policy here. 
In fact Metropolitan will not dispute that their policy does 
state in addition to insuring Douglas Wixom--in addition to 
insuring you for the operation of your named vehicle, owned 
vehicle, we will insure you when you use other vehicles. You 
do not dispute that, do you? 
MR. ERICSON: No. 
MR. DAVENPORT: You also state that we will insure 
your relatives if they operate non-owned vehicles, correct? 
MR. ERICSON: That's correct. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Okay. So the policy language itself 
is not only an owner's, it covers the use of the owned vehicle] 
referred to, but it also is an operator's policy because it 
insures you as an operator. You the named insured, and your 
relatives, and those defined in the policy. 
THE COURT: Operating a non-owned vehicle, all 
right. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Because you are operating a non-
owned vehicle. An operator's policy is for people operating 
non-owned automobiles. That's what it is. 
19 
Now, the Utah Court in Barber--and since it is critical, 
I am going to walk through this decision with the Court. If 
the Court will turn to my initial supporting memorandum--
excuse me, my reply memorandum, starting on page 5. This is 
so critical I am going to walk through it with the Court, thi^ 
Barber. It is right on the point and dispositive of this 
issue. I will let you find it first. 
My reply memorandum in part of our Motion for Summary 
Judgment entitled Reply Memorandum in Support of State Farm's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against Metropolitan, filed on 
March 24th--I think April 1st when the Court entered it on itsj 
documents. 
THE COURT: Okay, hold on just a moment. I have tocj 
many volumes in here. This is Metropolitan's reply? 
MR. DAVENPORT: No, this is State Farm's. 
THE COURT: State Farm's. I have that. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Turn to page 5. This is where I 
discuss the Barber decision. In all I take two and a half or 
three pages to discuss it. It is right on point and governs 
this issue here. 
You will notice at the top of the page I refer to the 
fact that Mario 3arber was driving an uninsured motor vehicle, 
okay, owned by a classmate. He is the son of Frank Barber. 
Now Frank Barber was issued a policy by Farmers on a 1974 
Honda, not the same vehicle involved. Okay, so it is an 
191 
owner's policy because it is issued on the 1974 Honda. 
Now the Court goes on to indicate that after pointing outj 
it was an owner's policy, the Court also points out that it 
was an operator's policy. And states, if you look at my 
quoting to the second sentence, it says the provision of the 
SRA governing coverage to non-owned motor vehicles provides irj 
relevant part, such operator's policy of liability insurance, 
and goes on to what the operator's liability policy requires. 
The case refers to a number of instances, refers to the fact 
this is not only an owner's policy by an operator's policy 
because it insures people that are the persons driving non-
owned vehicles. 
Now what is important here is what happened here. And 
maybe--in fact it would probably be beneficial to read these 
quotes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Despite this requirement, Farmers 
argued that it was not required to provide such coverage for 
Mario because he was not the "named insured" under the policy, 
but was covered only as a relative under the additional 
coverage provided by the policy. The provision of the SRA 
governing coverage to non-owned motor vehicles provides in 
relevant part, such operator's policy of liability insurance 
shall insure the person named as insured therein against loss 
from liability imposed upon him by law for damages arising by 
2a 
the use by him of any motor vehicle not owned by him within 
the same territorial limits and subject to the same limits of 
liability as are set forth with respect to an owner's policy 
of liability insurance. 
Now this is the prior statute, keep that in mind, saying 
okay, under this policy not only is it an owner's policy but 
we have to insure the named insured, Frank Barber, for his us^ 
of any non-owned motor vehicle. You will note--I will read 
some quotes later. And the Court goes on to say he was 
driving--there was an exclusion for electric busses and 
motorcycles. And the Court goes on to say so if Frank Barber 
was driving an electric bus or motorcycle, even though it was 
excluded in the policy, the statute governs and it mandates 
coverage for that. 
Now let's continue. Relying on another provision of the 
SRA, Farmers argued that Mario was not the named insured under! 
the Farmers policy, but the subject of additional coverage for) 
relatives of the named insured. That provision provides any 
policy which grants coverage required for a motor vehicle 
liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess 
of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor 
vehicle liability policy. And such excess or additional 
coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this act. 
Now this is the policy language that Metropolitan is 
relying on in their argument. You will notice what the Court 
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does witn this argument. It rejects Metropolitan's argument 
as it relates to the current case. 
It goes on to say Farmers argues since the coverage 
afforded by its policy to Mario for use of non-owned vehicle 
is "additional coverage", such coverage is not subject to the 
provisions of the SRA. Basically the same argument. 
Okay, let's see how the Court treats it. The SRA 
requires an operator's insurance policy to insure the person 
named as insured therein against loss from liability arising 
out of the use of vehicles not owned by the insured. But it 
fails to provide a definition of named as insured. 
Now this is the key. The statute you now have is 
different. And the Court talks about that as it goes on. 
However the immediately preceding provision pertaining to 
owned vehicles requires that owner's insurance policy to 
insure the person named therein and any other person against 
loss from liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of the vehicle. 
So going on quoting on the next page, it states omissions] 
of the words and any other person from section c, subsection 
C, suggests a distinction between insurance coverage with 
respect to accidents involving owned vehicles and those 
involving non-owned vehicles. Now this is all under the 
operator's policy. The distinction they are talking about we 
will note later. The Legislature removed that distinction as 
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the court said, okay. 
It goes on to say the SRA requires that insurance 
coverage on owned vehicles extend to the named insured and 
anyone else he or she lets drive the insured vehicle. Wherea^ 
only the named insured under the policy is required to be 
covered when operating an uninsured vehicle not owned by the 
insured. That is the key phrase there. 
So here it is talking about again the owner's portion of 
the policy and the operator's. They are saying under the 
owner's you have to insure the named insured, and anyone else 
he let's drive the vehicle, whereas only the named insured 
under the policy is required to be covered when operating an 
uninsured vehicle not owned by the insured. 
It goes on to say this, the Barbers have not provided us 
any authority that would suggest that the statute and the 
Farmer's policy should be interpreted other than in accordanc^ 
with these fairly clear terms, although they correctly argue 
our interpretation permits a window in coverage. This is the 
key. 
So you drop down--let me drop down to the next quote. 
That such a window was permitted to exist is shown by recent 
legislation designed to close all such windows. This is the 
key. Section 31a-22-303, the same one we have been referring 
to, of the new insurance code provides that all automobile 
insurance policies issued in this state shall inter alia 
23| 
insure persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption or guardianship, who are residents of the 
named insured's household, including those who usually make 
their home in the same household but temporarily live 
elsewhere to the same extent as the named insured. 
That is the amendment. What it is saying is now not onl^ j 
is the named insured under the operator portion of the policy 
required to be covered when he drives a non-owned auto, but 
the relatives are now. There was a window. Now there is no 
window. The Court said it is closed. This is on point and 
dispositive. 
Let me go on, because the--flip over on the next page. 
Let me read this last quote of that. Footnote 4--5. This is 
the same example we are using here. Even though--there is 
coverage had Frank been driving an uninsured motorcycle or 
even an uninsured electric bus. Now these are the ones that 
were excluded under the policy. The Court said he would have 
been entitled to coverage despite the policy's effort to 
exclude motorcycle and electric busses. Why? Because the 
statute governs. This is so because as he was named as 
insured, the SRA's provisions that liability coverage extend 
to him when driving uninsured vehicles, including motorcycles 
and electric busses, would take precedence. The key word, 
precedence. Now this is the key. The same is true of Mrs. 
Barber, who as the named--the insured spouse, was defined 
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under the policy as a named insured. You remember before 
under the prior provisions, it was only the named insured 
under the prior statutory scheme. Now listen to this. The 
silliness of the statutory regime in effect when the accident 
occurred show the legislature's wisdom in now requiring that 
all family members have exactly the same coverage under 
automobile policies written in this State. 
So what this Court is saying is had the current statutory] 
scheme been in effect at the time of that accident, the son, 
who was driving a non-owned motorcycle that was excluded by 
the policy, would have had coverage. That's what--this is on 
point. This is dispositive. 
Now one other point here. The Court points out--this 
Court followed the statute despite the fact that it called it 
silly. You posed a number of different hypotheticals. They 
are all real relevant. It doesn't matter that Metropolitan oil 
Farmers in this case charged a lesser premium, which I dispute) 
they did, because they were excluding motorcycles or electric 
busses. That's irrelevant. They have to charge the policy 
based upon what the statute requires. If they don't, that's 
their loss. But it is irrelevant as to whether or not they 
charge a premium for this or not. I am sure they did. But itj 
is irrelevant. 
So you have case law here that is dispositive. This casej 
not only says--well, first it says this policy, the 
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Metropolitan policy, just like the Farmer's policy, is both arj 
owner's and operator's policy. That's dispositive. Clearly 
sets it forth. 
Secondly, it clearly states that under the new statutory 
scheme you have to insure relatives to the same extent as the 
named insured and both--and in the new statutory scheme it 
states you insure them if they are operating non-owned 
vehicles, period. Doesn't--and in that statutory scheme you 
have to remember, your Honor, it lists the exceptions you can 
put in your policy. And none of the exceptions listed 
pursuant to statute allow--well, the statute doesn't allow an 
exception for ownership of another vehicle. 
Now I might point out that although this is required, 
from a practical standpoint there is nothing amiss about the 
fact that they don't--that you have to provide coverage for 
non-owned vehicles even if you own one. There are many peopl^ 
that own vehicles. I have owned vehicles in the past where I 
have just purchased one to fix it up and then sell it, and 
never insured it. Many people probably do that. There is no 
need to if it is just sitting there and you own it outright. 
There is no policy, public policy, that's being breached. 
But the bottom line, the Legislature sets forth what the 
policy is in the statute. It is irrelevant, but I am pointing[ 
out even if it was relevant there is nothing inappropriate 
about that type of situation. 
26| 
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THE COURT: Let me say this. I think I understand 
your argument. Let me hear again from Mr. Ericson 
specifically talking about the statute. And we will go from 
there. 
MR. DAVENPORT: The first point is this: There is 
another line of reasoning to demonstrate coverage. Under--as 
we have all discussed, and not disputed, the statutory scheme 
allows you to provide more coverage than allowed by statute. 
Now in this particular situation, the Metropolitan policy 
would have actually--say Douglas Wixom had this vehicle 
instead of Thor Wixom. Say it was his vehicle and not being 
used, and he owned it, and it wasn't insured on any policy 
excepting say the father had the vehicle. Under the 
Metropolitan policy, it would have provided coverage for 
Douglas Wixom had Douglas Wixom been operating Laura Johnson'^ 
vehicle. You don't dispute that? 
MR. ERICSON: You are saying he had several vehicle^ 
under the policy, but had another one that was not--
MR. DAVENPORT: He owned it. It wasn't insured, 
just sitting there, an antique. 
MR. ERICSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: So if he drove or an antique vehicle, 
there would be coverage. 
MR. ERICSON: Apparently. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
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MR. DAVENPORT: Now the statute says you have to 
insure the relatives to the same extent as the named insured. 
By that line of reasoning they have extended coverage to Thor 
Wixom under that line of reasoning. 
The last point I will make is--well, let me note before 
going to my last point, the Metropolitan policy also expressly 
states in it if any of its terms are contrary to Utah law, the 
Utah law governs. So the policy itself, by its own terms, ha^ 
to be read as though you are reading the statute. And so by 
its own terms these exclusions relied upon by Metropolitan ar^ 
not in effect. 
Finally, the last point is this, even assume the languag^ 
isn't applicable, which it is, there is a case right on point 
The statutory language requiring coverage, even if it wasn't 
applicable, saying we don't have the statute, the--and I won't] 
get into the specifics. You probably read my written 
memorandum. But the exclusion would not be applicable. The 
regular use language is already found to be ambiguous by a 
Utah Court.. In fact, the case was entitled Metropolitan vs. 
Finlayson. Again, with the other decisions, it is ambiguous. 
I won't get into that. I will leave that to the memorandum I 
filed. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. ERICSON: First of all, on the regular use 
thing, I don't know that--I think there are too many issues ofl 
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fact there to have that be determined on Summary Judgment. 
There are differences between that other Metropolitan case an4 
this case in the facts that would justify--this is not 
necessarily ambiguous. It was very fact related in the first 
Metropolitan case. I think I brought that up in our opening 
memorandum. I didn't address it in the reply. In my mind it 
is an issue that is fact intensive and cannot be resolved on 
Summary Judgment. 
Now with the Barber case, I would like to have counsel 
tell me where the Court sat down and said okay, we need to 
decide if this is an owner's or an operator's policy, or both 
The Court does not undertake that analysis in the Barber case 
All the Court does--it looks like they didn't pay very close 
attention at all to whether or not--to what type of policy 
they were dealing with. They never once talk about it being 
an owner's policy to my knowledge. They say it covered a 1974) 
Honda automobile. They didn't say so therefore it is an 
owner's policy. 
They do cite in several places the requirement of an 
operator's policy. And if you read close, go read the case, 
there is no analysis whatsoever by the Court as to whether or 
not it is an owner's or an operator's policy, or how that 
works in. They just completely ignore that issue. And so I 
don't think there was--if you read the case, very careful 
analysis, or even the decision, there was no decision at all 
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by the Supreme Court at all as to what type of policy this 
was. And I mean I have read it several times. I know they 
cite things about an operator's policy. It is lacking 
completely in any evaluation of this type policy. They just 
assume--they appear to assume certain things without looking 
closely at it. 
So what we have here--
THE COURT: Would you agree at least when we look at) 
Metropolitan's policy involved in this case that it does--I 
realize it is an attempt to put a label on something. But 
would you agree in terms of the function of owner's policy anc| 
operator's policy that it has both elements in it? 
MR. ERICSON: Yes, it does, it has both. I mean 
that's undisputable. It does. It says it will apply to non-
owned vehicles. But our position comes down to the fact that 
this is--once again an operator's policy is a different 
animal. If you want an affidavit from underwriters saying youj 
know, we sell operator's policies, and this ain't it, I mean 
we could do that. But this is an owner's policy that extends 
coverage greater than that mandated by statute. And as such, 
Metropolitan has the right to limit the coverage extended to 
those residents who own their own--relatives who own their owi^  
vehicle who should have their own liability coverage on their 
own vehicles. That is a right given to Metropolitan because 
they fully and completely complied in their policy with all 
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requirements of an owner's policy, with all requirements of aij 
owner's policy 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ERICSON: And that's really--that's it. 
THE COURT: I understand. Let me say the Court is 
ready to make its ruling. And I will indicate to you I have 
read the briefs, and my compliments to counsel. As I said, 
this is a tricky issue. The Court fully understands that on 
this kind of a question where the particular facts have not 
gone up to an appellate court that that's where the case may 
go. And the Court, with that understanding, I feel I have 
just got to look at what has been decided in the past, the 
statute, and make the best decision I can in this instance. 
And in this instance, I am going to deny Metropolitan's 
Motion and grant State Farm's based on the arguments made by 
State Farm. If you want to reiterate those in the Order--
MR. DAVENPORT: I will prepare the appropriate 
Order. 
THE COURT: I will ask that you submit that Order tcj 
Mr. Ericson for him to review. And at this point, the case 
now--now it is back, as I understand it, Mr. Ericson, it is 
back where with this Court's ruling at least you are the one 
that will work directly with probably Mr. Echard in terms of 
his approach to the case from here. 
MR. DAVENPORT: They have got to enter an appearance! 
3 J 
to defend Thor Wixom. 
MR. ERICSON: Metropolitan would have to defend 
Wixom based on this. 
THE COURT: Now the question--the reason I am 
raising this is I don't know whether an appeal--I will leave 
that up to you to decide if you want to request--whether it 
has to be requested as an interlocutory appeal. 
MR. ERICSON: Well, essentially--I am thinking out 
loud here. This is a third party declaration action, so your 
ruling brings to a close that issue. And in my mind it would 
be a final judgment that then would allow us to appeal as of 
right. Well, it also affects the underlying action. Part of 
it was they sued State Farm. And I am suing State Farm when 
they sued us based upon uninsured motorist and failure--
MR. ECHARD: And under insured, both. 
MR. DAVENPORT: The ruling in essence is dispositive] 
on the uninsured motorist claim. 
MR. ECHARD: Maybe not if it goes on appeal. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Unless there is an appeal. I am 
saying we have been in representing--in essence making sure 
our interests are adequately protected. And in doing so, 
basically doing a lot of defense work Metropolitan should have) 
been doing. But, you know, I guess after the Order we will 
need to flesh it out as to who is going to do what. 
THE COURT: You prepare the Order. Go ahead, Mr. 
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Echard. 
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MR, ECHARD: T think i*- clearly is not, l:.ev u 
:cillion dollar under insured. Bad faith goes to ;;oth, 
THE ^~TTT ' * ' ~ ' • "/ 
"ut ry gut feeling ' u ....ui. t;_^ . / / I C ^ X . t.-i^  c-cisicn a: 
Ah ^. has coverage responsibility h- re is v~ry entwined with 
udgment, you will have to look at it and evaluate how you 
teed *: o approach--what, if anything your client wants to d : 
MR. ECHARD: But I do need to know that family soon 
so I will know how to proceed on the other aspect of the case, 
THE COURT I 1 .] i  J "; i • •! . ] I j: r -oceed fi id 1 speed 
ahead on this side. ''What I am anticipating the 
representatives of Metropolitan, if they were hoping to take 
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an appeal up immediately on the decision, that given the fact 
it is intertwined with what you are doing, they would seek 
relief to do that, request for an interlocutory appeal, really] 
even though you may feel it is a final judgment. However you 
couch it, it has some cross over into that kind of Motion. 
And that would be argued by everyone who has an interest. 
I think if they look at an appeal a possible situation 
that if we go to trial the Plaintiff may not prevail in which 
case there is nothing for them to appeal on. I don't think 
that's very probable. I think probably a directed verdict as 
to liability on Defendants, which we will have to address. 
That's another aspect. So not appealing interlocutorily may 
be--
MR. DAVENPORT: But, your Honor, what you are 
saying, in my order it would be appropriate for me to indicat^ 
this is pursuant to Rule 56 or something, a final order? 
MR. ERICSON: 54. 
MR. DAVENPORT: 54(b) or something, final appealable! 
order. Thereby if it is not appealed within 3 0 days they lose) 
their right to appeal? 
MR. ERICSON: See, my point is I think it is a final] 
order, because there is nothing left to do to determine--you 
know, no other issues left in the third party complaint 
relating to the issues of the third party complaint. 
THE COURT: I think that is accurate. So maybe what] 
34 
\ rould have to be requested on motion is some kind of stay :: f 
the rest of the action pending the outcome of the appeal. 
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MR. DAVENPORT: And w-_- .. diar^ss the Motion to 
Stay by briefs and whatever Okay. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Weber ) 
) SS. 
I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of thq 
Official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and a 
competent machine shorthand writer. 
That on June 11, 1997, I reported in machine shorthand 
the proceedings had and testimony given in the case entitled 
Amy (Echard) Otto vs. Thor Y. Wixom and State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company. 
That thereafter, I reduced my machine shorthand notes to 
typewriting, and the foregoing transcript, pages 1 through 35, 
inclusive, constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of 
the proceedings had and testimony given at said time and 
place. 
In witness hereof I have hereunto set my hand this 2 9th 
day of August, 1997. 
ZL&kz^d^ 
JAMES N^/JONES 
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m etropolitan METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AOT CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE DECLARATIONS 06/24/96 ST 43 
POLICY NUMBER: > 529 
POLiCf EFFECTIVE DATE: 
POLICY;:- EXPIRATION 
4^x6148: 
Q9 : /16 /9 i 
03 / ; i6 /§2 
12!;01xA:.:M 
N H M E D INSURED: 
.LAS WIXOM 
; CHEROKEE LANE 
.x^;o .UT 84604 
iTRANSACTlON:TYPE: 
:x>>:;:>$I^SACT:lON 
: DUPLICATE 
EFFEC^IVE;^; i p / i p /91 
BILL TO; INSURED 
VEHjYEARlx-xMAKE: 
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION :>::::> 
MODEL BODYTYPE: YEWCLEtD NUMBER: CLASS: ;SYM TERRITORY 
33 
JO 
CHEVROLET 
SUZUKI 
CAPRICE 
SIDEKIC 
ST WAG 
2DR 
1G1AN35H8DX101864 
JS3TA01C0K4I18503 
B281000 
C281000 
7 
10 
05 
05 
COVERAGE f^ S€R*PTlQN^ ^^ ^^ ^^ >^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION: 
LIABILITY: 
BODILY INJURY 
PROPERTY DAMA.GE 
— S E E BELOW— 
PER PERSON/ 
PER OCCURRENCE 
PER OCCURRENCE 
VEH 1 VEH 2 
18 20 
45 
38 
49 
42 
UNINSURED MOTORISTS: 
BODILY INJURY 
P.' ICAL DAMAGE: 
AL. >AL CASH VALUE 
LESS DEDUCTIBLES FOR LOSS BY: 
COLLISION 
COMPREHENSIVE 
TOWING AND LABOR 
$25,000 PER PERSON/ 
$50,000 PER ACCIDENT 
VEH 1 'VEH 2 
$500 ??=> 
$0 $0 
LIMIT $35 . j. 
VEHICLE TOTALS: 
29 
32 
,ISABLEMENT INCL 
171 
62 
2 50 
TOTAL SEMI-ANNUAL PREMIUM. £421.00 
* * * *- » ^ a r ^ r * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * < ******************** * * * * * • 
03/05/42 
03/04/48 
DOUGLAS A WIXOM 
MINNIE J WIXOM 
IF YOU HAV E A DRIVER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO IS NOT LISTED ABOVE PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * A * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *«' * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * - -
VEH 2 - LIEN/LOSS PAYEE: VALLEY BANK ux 84115 
FOI i:.F S AND ENDOR SEMENT. 3' MPL 70' 56 000 C102 C106 UT#1A P634A P886 P649 P877A C100 
P643 
FOR SERVICE, CALL 1-800-422-4272 OR WRITE TO: 
FOR CLAIMS, SEE CLAIM DIRECTORY 
METROPOLITAN. 
P.O. BOX 48020 
DAYTON, OH 45448 
N38 206 1 
BB 
f 4Di aofifl-nnn Printed in U.S.A. 1284 
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Property and Liability Insurance Company 
and Subsidiaries 
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SPECIAL STA FE PROVISIONS 
See Enclosed Material 
THE COMPANY NAMED IN THE DECLARATIONS 
KNOWN AS METROPOLITAN 
(A Stock Insurance Company) 
Administrative Offices: Warwick, Rhode Island 
STRAIGHT TALK AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY 
INSURANCE AGREEMENT AND DECLARATIONS 
This insurance policy is a legal contract between you (the policy owner) and us (Metropolitan). It Insures you and your 
automobile for the kinds of insurance you have selected, as shown in the Declarations. The Declarations are an impor-
tant part of this policy. By accepting this policy, you agree that the statements contained in the Declarations and in any 
application are your true and accurate representations. This policy is issued and continued in reliance upon the truth of 
those representations and the payment of required premium. It embodies all agreements between you and us and any 
of our sales representatives relating to this insurance. 
The exact terms and conditions are explained in the following pages. 
( Note: The words in bold-face type in this policy are defined in SECTION VI - GENERAL DEFINITIONS, starting on 
Page 7 of this policy.) 
SECTION I 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
If applicable, see Special State Provisions. 
SECTION II 
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY COVERAGE 
COVERAGE PROVIDED 
We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage to others for which the law holds an insured respon-
sible because of an occurrence which results from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered automobile or a 
non-owned automobile . We will defend the insured . at our expense with attorneys of our choice, against any suit or 
claim seeking these damages . We may Investigate, negotiate, or settle any such suit or claim. 
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS WE WILL PROVIDE 
In addition to the nits of liability, we will pay the following expenses incurred \n connection with any claim or suit to 
which the policy applies: 
(a) Premiums on appeal bonds in any suit we defend. 
(b) Premiums on bonds to release attachments In any suit we defend. The total amount of the bonds must not 
exceed our limit of liability. 
(c) Up to $250 for any bail bond needed because of an accident or traffic violations arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or ^se of a covered automobile . 
We have no duty to furnish or apply for any bonds. 
(d) Court costs levied against the insured . 
(e) Interest on all damages following a judgment until we pay. offer or deposit in court the amount due up to our 
limit of liability. 
(f) Expenses paid by the insured for first aid to others at the time of an automobile accident. 
(g) Up to $50 per day for lost wages, but not for loss of other income, if we ask the insured to attend a hearing or 
trial. 
(h) Other reasonable expenses incurred at our request. 
WE DO NOT COVER: 
(a) BODILY INJURY TO ANY EMPLOYEE OF AN INSURED ARISING OUT OF HIS OR HER EMPLOYMENT. EX-
CEPT DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES WHO ARE NOT COVERED OR REQUIRED TO BE COVERED UNDER ANY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW. 
(b) BODILY INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERED UNDER AN ATOMIC OR NUCLEAR ENERGY 
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY, OR THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED HAD THAT POL1C i NUT U L L N 
NATED UPON EXHAUSTION OF ITS LIMIT OF LIABILITY. 
(c ; Y INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE DUE TO WAR, CIVIL WAR, INSURRECTION, REBELLION OR 
REVOLUTION. 
(d) ANY COVERED AUTOMr j . u u ^ - o , OM USEL) [^ . " " • "'""' "'^ "* * °HARGF 
- EXCEPTION: This excluss- .. aly to shared expense car poofs 
(e) BODILY INJURY OR PROPE-"Y DAMAGE ARISING OUT OF AUTO1*5 S~ _- :; .^NESS OPERATIONS. EX-
CEPTION: This exclusion does ' .^ Btz'y to the use of a . , -, ^i^tivo or by any 
other person in an automobile business in which you ha 
(f) ANY NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE WHILE USED BY AN4- FT- . > H . ' \Y BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION. 
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to a priva:^ r i merger automobile or utility trailer used there 
with, if driven or occupied by you or your chauffeur or Jc^esttc servant. 
(g) ANY AUTOMOBILE WHILE BEING USED TO TOW A TRAILER NOT COVERED BY LIKE INSURANCE WITH 
US 
(h) ANY I RA1LER COVERED 8Y THIS POLICY WHILE BEING USED W! I H ANY AUTOMOBILE OWNED OR 
HIRED BY AN INSURED AND NOT COVERED BY LIKE INSURANCE WITH US . 
(i) BODILY INJURY TO A FELLOW EMPLOYEE WHILE ON THE JOB AND ARISING FROM The UL-c Ur -•; 
AUTOMOBILE OR TRAILER IN THE BUSINESS OF HIS ~ W C ! r.vzn^ =Yr?PTION: You are covered in this 
situation. 
(j) DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OWNED OR TRANSPORTED BY AN INS 
(k) DAMAGE TO PROPERTY RENTED TO OR IN CHARGE OF AN ^ ' '- ' , OR 
PRIVATE GARAGE. 
(I) DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AS TO WHICH AN INSURED :S F^H ^ , - PURPOSE EXERCJOING - m i i C A L 
CONTROL. 
(m) BODILY INJURE 
I. YOU ; OR 
ii. ANY PERSON RELATED BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE, I " 'I '" N AM ' f'LSIl^':/ ' " ' »" 
HOUSEHOLD AS: 
1. YOU; OR 
2. ANY OTHER INSURED ; OR 
3. ANY PERSON FOR WHOSE USE «¥ I HI H U^R VFHin F f"iR TRAILER AN INSURED IS LEGALLY 
RESPONSIBLE. 
THIS EXCLUSION APPLIES REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DEMAND IS MADE OR SUIT IS BROUGHT 
AGAINST THE INSURED BY THE INJURED PERSON OR BY A THIRD PARTY SEEKING CONTRIBUTION OR 
INDEMNITY, 
._...:.. _: - ABILITY 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each person" for Bodily Injury Liability is the most we will pay for 
bodily injury sustained by any one person as the result of any one occurrence . Subject to this limit for "each person",' 
the limit shown in the Declarations for "each occurrence" for Bodily Injury Liability is the most we will pay for all 
damages for bodily injury resulting from any one occurrence . The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
occurrence" for Property Damage Liability is the most we will pay for ail damages to all property resulting from any one 
occurrence . If a single limit of liability is shown In the Declarations for bodily Injury and property damage , it is the 
maximum we will pay for any one accident for all damages . 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for" all damages result-
ing from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. Covered persons ; or 
2. Claims made; or 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; 
or 
4. Ver -
A motor vehicle and attached trailer are considered one vehicle for the purpose of this automobile liability - < " .euje. 
2 
If notice of this policy is given \n lieu of security or if we certify this policy as proof under any financial responsibility law. 
the limit of liability will be applied to provide separate limits for bodily injury liability and property damage liability to 
the extent required by such law. Such separate application will not increase the total limit of our liability. 
CONFORMITY WITH FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LA VS 
If we certify this policy under any financial responsibility law. this liability coverage will comply to the extent of the 
liability coverage and limits required by the law. You agree to repay us for any payment made by us which we would 
not have paid under this oolicy were it not for this provision. 
OUT OF STATE INSURANCE 
if any insured becomes subject to a financial responsibility law or the compulsory insurance law or similar laws of 
another state or Canada because of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered automobile in that state or 
Canada, we will interpret this policy to provide the coverage required by those laws. The coverage provided shall be 
reduced to the extent that other automobile liability insurance applies. No person . may, in any event, collect more than 
once for the same loss. 
REDUCTION 
Any amount payable to an injured person under this section will be reduced by any amount that person is paid under 
SECTION IV - PROTECTION AGAINST UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE of this policy. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other similar insurance, we will pay our fair share. 
However, with respect to a non-owned automobile or a substitute automobile . this insurance will be excess over 
any other insurance. If there is other excess or contingent insurance, we will pay our fair share. 
Our fair share is the proportion that our limit bears to the total of all applicable limits. 
SECTION III 
AUTOMOBILE MEDICAL EXPENSE COVERAGE 
COVERAGE PROVIDED 
We will pay reasonable medical expenses incurred by you or any relative for bodily injury as a result of an accident 
involving an automobile. 
We will pay reasonable medical expenses Incurred by any other person for bodily injury as a result of occupying or 
using the covered automobile at the time of the accident with your consent, being struck by the covered automobile, 
or occupying a non-owned automobile if the bodily injury results from the operation or occupancy of such non-
owned automobile by you or a relative . 
WE DO NOT COVER: 
(a) MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED FOR SERVICES FURNISHED MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER THE DATE 
OF ACCIDENT. 
(b) ANY PERSON INJURED WHILE IN A VEHICLE LOCATED FOR USE AS A RESIDENCE OR PREMISES. 
(C) BODILY INJURY DUE TO WAR. CIVIL WAR. INSURRECTION. REBELLION OR REVOLUTION. 
(d) THAT PORTION OF ANY MEDICAL EXPENSE FOR WHICH BENEFITS ARE AVAILABLE UNDER ANY: 
i. PREMISES INSURANCE WHICH AFFORDS BENEFITS FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES ; Of( 
ii. LAW WHICH PROVIDES WORKERS COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY BENEFITS; OR 
iii. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE OF THIS POLICY. 
(e) BODILY INJURY SUSTAINED WHILE OCCUPYING ANY OWNED MOTOR VEHICLE NOT DEFINED AS AN 
AUTOMOBILE. 
(f) ANY PERSON CONVICTED OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR NARCOTIC DRUGS. 
ALSO, WE DO NOT COYER, EXCEPT FOR BODILY It 1JURY SUSTAINED AS fi 
PEDESTRIAN, THE FOLLOWING: 
(a) A COVERED AUTOMOBILE WHILE HIRED OR RENTED FO OTHERS FOR A CHARGE, OR AN 1 
AUTOMOBILE WHICH YOU ARE DRIVING WHILE AVAILABLE FOR HIRE BY THE PUSUC. EXCEPTION: This 
exclusion does not apply to shared expense car pools. 
/ W i
 < VOllY INJURY ARISING OUT OF AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS OPERATIONS. EXCEPTION: This exclusion 
-s not apply to the use of a covered automobile by you , a relative , or any other person In an automobile 
.• ,
:ness in which you have an interest as owner or partner. 
NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE WHILE USED BY ANY P f c h ^ . ;.NE35 OR OCCUPATION. 
C A U E P T I O N : This exclusion does not apply to a private passenger diuutuuune or utility trailer , used there-
with, if driven or occupied by you or your chauffeur or domestic servant. 
L IMIT OF LIABILI I Y 
The limit shown in the Declarations for "each person" is the maximum, we will pay for any one person as a result of any 
one accident 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum, limit of liability for all damages result-
ing from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. Covered persons ; or 
2. Claims made: or 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations: 
or 
4 \ • • . - • • ' : . d e n t , 
The total amount we will pay includes funeral and burial expenses not to exa , uJ '!. I ' '"J1,:1 h i *\JL1 i p"i". 11 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other similar insurance, we will pay our fair share. With respect to a non-owi led automobile or a subst'itute 
automobile , this insurance will be excess over any other insurance. If there is other excess or contingent insurance. 
we will pay our fair share. This coverage shall be excess over any personal injury protection benefits paid or payable. 
except for a deductible under this or any other motor vehicle insurance policy, for bodily injury to any eligible person.. 
Our fair share is the proportion that our limit bears to the total of all applicable limits. 
PROTECTION AGAINST UNi N J J . . . . 11S I !:; L U V b H " ' i I 
COVERAGE PROVIDED ONLY IF SHOV... . hE DECLARATIONS . 
We v.*;', pay bcd.iy injury damages , caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an 
uninsured highway vehicle . which you or a relative are legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an unin-
sured highway vehicle . Any other person occupying a covered automobile has the same rights as you . 
Wheii. 3rson is legally entitled to collect of.i• • • •»• j . • s ur ide< this section t. i u id the amount to which such person is 
entitled. . uetermined by agreement between that person and us . Upon written consent ol both parties, any dis-
agreement will be settled by arbitration. 
If either party does not consent to arbitrate these questions, the insured shall. 
(a) File a lawsuit In the proper court against, the owner or driver of the uninsured motor vehicle and us, , or if such 
owner or driver is unknown, against us ; and 
(b) Upon filing, give us copies of the summons and complaints filed by ti ie insured in that action, and 
(c) Secure a judgment in that action. The judgment must be the final result of an actual trial and an appeal, if an ap-
peal is taken. 
If the insured filed suit against the owner or driver of the uninsured motoi vehicle „ we have the right to defend on, the 
issues of the legal liability of and the damages owed by such owner or driver 
Except as provided above: 
1. We are not bound by any judgment against any person or organization obtained without our written consent; 
and 
2. The insured shall not enter into any settlement with any person or organization legally liable for the insured's 
bodily injury without our written consent if the settlement agreement precludes our right of recovery against such 
-person or organization. 
WE DO NOT COVER: 
(a) ANY PERSON OCCUPYING OR STRUCK BY A HIGHWAY VEHICLE OWNED 8Y YOU OR BY A RELATIVE , 
OTHER THAN A COVERED AUTOMOBILE . 
(b) ANY PERSON WHO SETTLES A BODILY INJURY CLAIM WtTHOUT OUR WRITTEN CONSENT. 
(c) ANY CLAIM WHICH WOULD BENEFIT ANY INSURER OR SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY WORKERS COM-
PENSATION, DISABILITY BENEFITS, OR SIMILAR LAW. 
(d) ANY CLAIM FOR WHICH BENEFITS ARE PROVIDED UNDER THE PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
COVERAGE OF THIS POJCY. 
(e) ANY PERSON . OTHER THAN YOU . OR A RELATIVE , WHILE OCCUPYING 
i. A COVERED AUTOMOBILE WHILE IT IS BEING USED TO CARRY PERSONS OR PROPERTY FOR A 
FEE. EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to shared expense car pools. 
ii. A VEHICLE WHILE BEING USED WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE OWNER. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
The limit shown in the Declarations for "each person" is the maximum we will pay to any one person for all damages 
resulting from any one accident. The limit shown in the Declarations for "each accident" is the maximum we will pay to 
two or more persons . If a single limit of liability is shown in the Declarations for this coverage, it is the maximum we 
•will pay for any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. Covered persons ; or 
2. Claims made; or 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; 
or 
4. Vehicles involved in the accident. 
REDUCTIONS 
Any amount payable to any person under this section will be reduced by any amount that person : 
(a) is entitled to recover from any legally responsible person or organization. 
(b) is paid or will be paid under a workers compensation or any similar law. 
(c) is paid under the Automobile Liability Coverage section of this policy. 
Medical expenses paid or payable under the Automobile Medical Expense Coverage will not be paid for again as 
damages under this coverage. This does not reduce the limits of this coverage. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other similar insurance, we will pay only our fair share. The to.al amount you recover under all policies will be 
limited to the highest of :ne applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance. 
Our fair share is the proportion that our limit bears to the total of ail applicable limits. However, if you do not own the 
automobile . our insurance will be excess over other similar insurance available to the insured but only in the amount 
by which the limit of liability of this policy exceeds the limits of liability of the other available insurance. If there is other 
excess or contingent insurance, we will pay our fair share. 
EXCESS INSURANCE 
Any insurance under this section will be excess over any Personal Injury Protection Coverage of this policy. 
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SECTION V 
PHYSICAL ~ ...;,-> — JVI !IA(:ii: 
COVERAGE PROVIDED 
We will pay for direct and accidental loss to your covered automobile or to a non-owned pri /ate passei iget 
ai itoi i labile . including its equipment, minus any applicable deductible shown in the Declarations. We will waive the 
deductible if the loss is caused by collision with another automobile insured by a METROPOLITAN company. We will 
pay for loss caused by collision or comprehensive only as shown in the Declarations. 
WE . ,<.. . KESE ADDITIONAL COSTS: 
(a) covered automcb.le is disabled, >e ,.::! pay up to the maximum limit shown in the Declarations for (he 
.csts of iabor done at the place of disabiemer it and costs of towing for each disablement. 
K
 a iisablement occurs as a result of loss to the covered automobile , we will pay up to $15 for substitute 
:r .donation to reach the intended destination. 
•fa loss is caused to the covered automobile by a peril insured against uf tdei tl lis section, we will pay up to 
l?"C for loss'to clothes and luggage belonging to you or a relative which are in the covered automobile . 
* T -overed automobile is stolen, we will pay up to $15 per day for substitute transportation. The total 
' - . --e will pay is $450. The period for which payment will be made wil! begin 43 hours after !he theft is 
- : tec! :c us and will end when we offer settlement for the theft. 
•<'*•• */ul pay general average and salvage charges for which you become legally liable for transporting i\ ie 
we red automobile . 
WE :.'G NOT COVER: 
(a; ' , / * COVERED A i re^OSILE WHILE USED TO CARRY PERSONS OR PROHbHh I ' 'll '\ I ": '. > - C C:»' 
This dc-:'; '• ;i .•:;. : - shared expense car pools. 
(b, - -. . JCR VfcH CwE .vl ^ /VNED BY YOU WHILE BEING USED ll J AN AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS . 
(c) ANY AUTOMOBILE NCT DESCRIBED IN THE DECLARATIONS COVERED BY OTHER INSURANCE. This ex-
••n does not apply to commercially rented vehicles used on a temporary basis, but this insurance would 
o .1, apply as excess insurance. 
ANY LOSS DUE AND CONFINED TO WEAR AND TEAR, FREEZING, OR MECH. N.v- \_ ,-• . i . 
BREAKDOWN. UNLESS THE LOSS RESULTS FROM A THEFT. 
TIRES UNLESS STOLEN. DAMAGED BY FIRE OR VANDALISM. OR UNLESS ANOTHER LOSS HAPPENS AT 
ME SAME TIME FOR WHICH THERE IS COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY. 
3 TO SOUND EQUIPMENT NOT PERMANENTLY INSTALLED IN THE COVERED AUTOMOBILE . 
(g) 3 TO TAPES. RECORDS, OR OTHER DEVICES DESIGNED FOR USE WITH SOUND EQU1PMEN1 
(h) , >S TO SOUND RECEIVING OR TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT OESIGNED FOR USE AS A CITIZEfIS 
.AND RADIO, TWO WAY MOBILE RADIO OR TELEPHONE. INCLUDING ITS ACCESSORY FQUIPM~\r. 
r
" ANTENNA. 
TO A CAMPER BODY , NOT DESCRIBED IN THE DECLARATIONS. FOR WHICH NO - •<•<; 
J CHARGED AND WHICH YOU OWNED AT THE START OF THE POLICY OR AT A^ - j U t M i 
ANNIVERSARY DATE. 
LOSS DUE TO WAR. CIVIL WAR, INSURRECTION. REBELLION, OR REVOLUTION, 
LOSS DUE TO RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION. 
' " S TO PARTS. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT. ACCESSORIES. INTERIOR COVERINGS, EXTERNAL FINISHES. 
\NY COMBINATION THEREOF. ADDED TO A PICK-UP. PANEL TRUCK. OR VAN AFTER THE EFFEC-
TIVE DATE OF COVERAGE FOR THESE VEHICLES AS SHOW' I !M THE DECLARATIONS. 
MAXIMUM AMOUNT WE WILL PAY 
Our payments will not exceed the lesser of: 
(a) the actual cash value of the property at tl ie tin ie of loss ; oi" 
(b) the cost to repair or replace the property with other of like kind and quality. 
If liie loss is only to a part of the property, our respon ,ibilii/ > - lu M I, i ! ,n
 ( i , n i \y. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If you have other insurance against a loss covered by this policy, we will pay our fair share. Our fair share is the 
proportion that our limit bears to the total of all applicable limits. 
YOUR DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF LOSS 
You must: 
(a) protect the automobile from further loss . We will pay you for reasonable expenses incurred for this protection. 
We will not cover any loss which results from your failure to protect the automobile from further loss . 
(b) file with us a proof of loss within 91 days or within the number of days required by law. 
(c) show us the damaged property and submit to examination under oath upon request. 
NO BENEFIT TO BAILEE 
This coverage shall not directly or indirectly benefit any carrier or bailee for hire for loss to the covered automobile . 
RIGHT TO APPRAISAL 
If within 60 days after proof of toss is filed there is a disagreement as to the amount, you or we may demand an ap-
praisal. Each party will select a competent appraiser. Each appraiser will state separately the actual cash value and the 
amount of loss . If they fail to agree, they must select and submit their differences to a competent and disinterested 
umpire. Agreement by any two will determine the amount of loss . Each party will pay his chosen appraiser and will 
equally share the expenses of the appraisal and umpire. 
PAYMENT OF LOSS 
We may pay for the loss in money, or may repair the damaged property, or may replace the damaged or stolen 
property. We may. at any time before the loss is paid or the property replaced, return at our own expense any stolen 
property. We will return the property to you or to the address shown in the Declarations, at our option. We may take ail 
or part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value, but you cannot abandon the property to us . We 
may settle any claim or loss either with you , the owner, or any other party who has an interest, title, or lien on the 
property. 
SECTION VI 
GENERAL DEFINITIONS 
The following words and phrases appear repeatedly throughout this policy. They have a special meaning and are to be 
given that meaning whenever used in connection with this policy or any endorsement which is part of this policy: 
" actual cash value " means the amount which it would cost to repair or replace damaged property, less allowance for 
physical deterioration and depreciation. 
" automobile " means a four-wheel land motor vehicle designed for use mainly on public roads. The term does not in-
clude: 
(a) any vehicle while used as a dwelling, place of business or other premises: or 
(b) any other land motor vehicle of the type commonly referred to as "midget automobile", "kart". "go-kart". "speed-
mobile", or any other comparable name whether built commercially or otherwise; or 
(c) any amphibious vehicle whether or not self-propelled, or to any property or equipment contained in or used 
with the vehicle while the vehicle is being launched into, used on. or beached from water. 
- automobile business M means the business or occupation of selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing, or parking 
motor vehicles or trailers. 
" bodily injury " means any bodily injury, sickness, or disease sustained by any person . The term includes death of 
any person if it is a result of covered bodily injury, sickness, or disease. 
* camper body " means a body designed for mounting on a covered automobile which is equipped with sleeping or 
living quarters. 
7 
collision " means the upset of a covered automobile or the contact of a covered automobile with another object or 
vehicle. 
" comprehensive " means a loss caused by, but limited to the following: 
1. Missiles or falling objects; 
2. -Fire; 
3. Theft or larceny; 
4. Explosion or earthquake; 
5. Windstorm; 
6. Hail, water or flood; 
7. Malicious mischief or vandalism; 
8. Riot or civil commotion; 
9. Contact with a bird or animal; 
10, Breakage of glass. 
EXCEPTION: BREAKAGE OF GLASS CAUSED BY COLLISION WILL BE CONSIDERED A LOSS CAUSED BY 
COLLISION . 
" covered automobile" means: 
(a) Under the Personal Injury Protection, Automobile Liability Coverage, and Automobile Medical Expense 
Coverage sections of this policy: 
L an eligible-private passenger automobile or utility automobile owned by you . or hired under a written 
contract for one year or more, and described In the Declarations, but only with respect to coverage for 
which a specific premium is charged. 
n. an eligible private passenger automobile or utility automobile newly acquired by you . but only if it 
replaces a motor vehicle described in the policy. 
iii. any other eligible private passenger automobile or utility automobile . newly acquired by you , but only if: 
(1) We insure all other eligible private passenger automobiles and utility automobiles owned by you 
on the date of acquisition; 
(2) You notify us within 30 days of acquisition of your election to make this and no other policy issued by 
us applicable to the motor vehicle; and 
(3) You pay any additional premium required by us . 
rv. a substitute automobile . 
v. a utility trailer when used with any covered automobile described in this definition. 
(b) Under the Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Coverage section of this policy: 
t. an eligible private passenger automobile or utility automobile described In the Declarations to which the 
Automobile Liability Coverage of this policy applies, but only with respect to coverage for which a specific 
premium is charged. 
ii. a substitute automobile . 
iii. a highway vehicle while being operated by you which is neither owned by you or any relative . nor fur-
nished or available for the regular use of you or any relative . 
(c) Under the Physical Damage Coverage section of this policy: 
i. an eligible private passenger automobile . utility automobile . or a trailer designed for use with a private 
passenger automobile or utility automobile owned by you or hired under a written contract for one year 
or more. w,hich is described in the Declarations, but only with respect to coverage for which a specific 
premium-is charged. 
ii. an eligible private passenger automobile , utility automobile . or troiler newly acquired by you if it 
replaces a vehicle described in (i) above, or we insure all vehicles owned by you at the time of acquisition 
and at least one of the other vehicles described in the Declarations is a covered automobile as defined in 
(i) above. In addition, you must notify us within 30 days of the acquisition of your election to make this 
policy and no other policy issued by us applicable to the vehicle. You must pay any additional premium re-
quired by us . 
IVt. any other eligible private passenger automobile or utility automobile . newly acquired by you . but only if: 
(1) we insure all other eligible private passenger automobiles and utility automobiles owned by you on 
the date of such acquisition; 
(2) you notify us within 30 days of acquisition of your election to make this and no other policy issued by 
a 
us applicable to the motor vehicle; and 
(3) you pay any additional premium required by us . 
iv. a substitute automobile . 
" damages " means the cost of paying those who suffer bodily injury or property damage . 
" highway vehicle " means a land motor vehicle or trailer other than: 
(a) a farm type tractor or other farm equipment designed for use principally off public roads, while not upon public 
roads; or 
(b) a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads; or 
(c) a vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises. 
" insured H means: 
(a) with respect to a covered automobile : 
i. You ; or 
ii. Any relative ; or 
iii. Any other person using it within the scope of your permission; 
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile : 
i. You ; or 
ii. Any relative but only with respect to a private passenger automobile . utility automobile . or utility 
trailer. The actual operation or use of such a vehicle must have been with the permission of. or reasonably 
believed to have been with the permission of. the owner.- The operation or use must also have been within 
the scope of the permission given: 
(c) any other person or organization if liable due to the acts or omissions of any insured described above. This 
provision does not apply if the automobile involved is a non-owned automobile owned or hired by the person 
or organization or 
(d) any person or organization who owns or leases the hired automobile to you . if that person or organization is 
legally responsible for your use of the hired automobile. 
m
 loss w means direct and accidental loss or damage. 
" medical expenses " means reasonable expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray. ambulance, hospital, profes-
sional nursing, funeral, and dental services, including prosthetic devices. 
" non-owned automobile " means an automobile which is neither owned by. furnished to. nor made available for 
regular use to you or any resident in your household. This does not include a substitute automobile . A utility trailer 
when used with a non-owned automobile is covered except with respect to Section V, Physical Damage Coverage. 
- occupying " and " occupied " mean being in or upon, entering into, or alighting from a motor vehicle. 
" occurrence " means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, resulting in bodily injury 
or property damage neither expected nor intended by the person claiming insurance coverage under this policy. 
" person " o r " persons " mean a natural person only. This does not include a corporation, partnership, association, or 
business name. 
" private passenger automobile * means an automobile of the private passenger type designed solely for the 
transportation of people and their personal luggage. 
" property damage " means physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including the loss of use of such 
property. 
" relative " means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption, and who also resides in your household. 
Your unmarried and unemancipated children, while away from your household attending school or in active military 
service, are considered residents of your household. Relative does not include any person or the spouse of any per-
son who owns a private passenger automobile . 
" substitute automobile H means an automobile not owned by you or any resident of the same household and which 
is used with the owner's permission to replace for a short time a covered automobile . The covered automobile has 
to be out of use for servicing or repair or because of breakdown, loss , or destruction. 
" uninsured highway vehicle * means: 
(a) A motor vehicle to which no insurance policy or other financial security \s applicable at the time of the accident; 
(b) A motor vehicle with respect to which insurance or other financial security covering bodily injury is in effect at 
the time of the accident, but the amount of bodily injury coverage under such insurance and other financial 
security is less than the amounts specified by an applicable motor vehicle financial responsibility law. motor 
vehicle compulsory insurance law. or similar applicable law. For the purposes of Protection Against Uninsured 
Motorists Coverage, the applicable law shall be the law of the state in which the covered automobile is prin-
cipally garaged; 
(c) A motor vehicle which has a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident, 
but the company writing such bond or policy denies coverage, or is or becomes insolvent; or 
(d) A hit and run highway vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured as the result of striking the insured or 
a motor vehicle which he is occupying at the time of the accident, if: 
i. The ideniliy of either the drWer or owner of the hit and run vehicle is unknown; 
ii. The accident is reported within 24 hours to a police officer, a peace or judicial officer, or the Commissioner 
or Director of Motor Vehicles; 
ifi. The insured or someone on his behalf files with us within 30 days of the accident a statement under oath 
that the insured or his legal representative has a cause of action due to the accident for damages against a 
person or persons whose identity is unknown; and 
*rv. The insured or his legal representative makes available for inspection by us . when requested, the motor 
vehicle occupied by the insured at the time of the accident. 
The term " uninsured highway vehicle " does not include: 
(a) a covered automobile or highway vehicle regularly furnished or available for the use of you or any relative ; 
or 
(b) an automobile owned and operated by a self-insurer as defined in the applicable motor vehicle financial 
responsibility law, compulsory insurance law, motor earner law. or any other similar applicable law; or 
(c) an automobile owned by the United States of America. Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any such 
government, or an agency of any of the foregoing. 
- utility automobile " means a pick-up, panel truck, or van which is not used for business or commercial purposes 
other than farming or ranching, unless the business or commercial purpose is described In the Declarations. 
" utility trai ler" means a trailer designed for use with a private passenger automobile or utility automobile which is 
not used as. an office, store, display, or passenger trailer and a farm wagon or farm implement when used with a 
private passenger automobile or utility automobile . 
" we" , " us "." our" and " company " mean the company named \n the Declarations. 
" you " and " your" mean the person or persons named in the Declarations of this policy as named insured and the 
spouse of such person or persons if a resident of the same household. 
SECTION VII 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
1. TERRITORY AND POLICY PERIOD 
This policy applies to accidents, occurrences , and losses which happen while the policy is in effect: 
(a) in the United States, its territories or possessions: 
(b) In Canada: 
(c) while the covered automobile is being shipped between their ports; and 
(d) during the policy period shown by the effective date and expiration date in the Declarations, or until the ef-
fective date and time of cancellation at your address shown in the Declarations. 
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2. PREMIUM 
All premiums for this policy will be computed in accordance with our rules, rates, rating plans, premiums and min-
imum premiums which apply to the insurance provided by this policy. The policy premium may be recomputed 
upon expiration of the Policy Period as shown in the Declarations. 
-Premiums are payable on the dates set forth by us . If a change requires a premium adjustment, we will adjust the 
premium as of the effective date of the change. 
All premium adjustments made for any reason will be rounded to the nearest dollar, in accordance with the 
manuals in use by us . 
3. LIBERALIZATION 
We will automatically give you the benefits of any extension or broadening of this policy if the change does not 
require additional premiums. 
From time to time we may replace this policy to reflect any changes introduced since it was issued. However, any 
replacement policy will not change the limits of coverage with respect to any accident, occurrence . or loss 
which occurs before it was replaced. 
4. OTHER AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE WITH US 
If two or more automobile insurance policies issued by us apply to any accident, occurrence . or loss , the most 
we will pay is the highest dollar limit or benefit in any one such policy. 
5. IF AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS OCCURS 
You or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible of any accident or loss . The notification 
should include as many details as possible, including names and addresses of drivers, injured persons and wit-
nesses, and the time, place, and circumstances of the accident or loss . We may require it in writing. 
In the event of a theft, you must promptly notify the police. If a claim or suit is made, immediately forward to us 
every claim, demand, notice, summons, or other process. 
If any legal action is begun before we make payment under any coverage, a copy of the summons and complaint 
or other process must be forwarded to us immediately. 
6. YOUR DUTY TO COOPERATE 
You must cooperate with us in every effort to investigate the accident or loss . settle any claims and defend you . 
You must attend hearings and trials and assist in securing and giving evidence and obtaining the attendance of 
witnesses. Except at your own cost, you will not voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation, or incur 
any expense, other than for first aid to others at the time of the accident. 
Under the Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Insurance Coverage, we may require you to take appropriate 
action to preserve your right to recover damages from any other person responsible for the bodily injury . Also, 
in any lawsuit against us , we may require you to join the responsible person as a defendant. 
These duties also apply to any other person making a claim under this policy. 
7. LAWSUITS AGAINST US 
You may not sue us unless there is full compliance with all of the terms of the policy. 
You may not sue us under the Automobile Liability Coverage until the amount of legal liability has been finally 
determined either by judgment after trial or by written agreement of you . the claimant, and us. However, no one 
has the right to make us a party in a suit to determine legal responsibility. Your bankruptcy or insolvency will not 
relieve us of any obligation under this policy. 
You may not sue us under Physical Damage Coverage until 30 days after proof of loss is filed and the amount of 
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loss is determined as provided in this policy. 
These conditions also apply to any other person insured under this policy. 
8. MEDICAL REPORTS; PROOF AND PAYMENT OF CLAIM 
Any person making a claim must, as soon as possible: 
(a) give us details about thedeath, injury, treatment, and other information we need to determine the amount 
payable. Forms for providing this information may be provided by us ; 
(b) consent to be examined by physicians chosen and paid by us when, and as often as, we reasonably may 
require; 
(c) execute authorizations to permit us to obtain medical reports and records. If the person is dead or unable 
to act. such authorizations must be executed by his or her legal representative; 
(d) submit to examinations under oath as often as we reasonably may require. 
Under Personal Injury Protection Coverage and Automobile Medical Expense Coverage, we may pay the injured 
person or any person or organization rendering the services. Any such payment will reduce the total amount we 
will pay for the injury. Any payment by us will not constitute admission of liability. 
Under Personal Injury Protection Coverage and Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Coverage, we may pay 
any amount due to: 
(a) the injured person ; or 
(b) if the injured person is a minor, his parent or guardian; or 
(c) if the injured person is deceased, the surviving spouse; or 
(d) the person authorized by law to receive such payment: or 
(e) the person entitled by law to recover the damages which the payment represents. 
9. OUR RECOVERY RIGHT 
in the event of any payment under this policy, we are entitled to all of the rights of recovery of the person to 
whom, or on whose behalf, payment was made. 
That person must: 
(a) hold in trust for us all rights of recovery; 
(b) sign and deliver to us any legal papers relating to the recovery; 
(c) help us exercise those rights and do nothing after loss to prejudice our rights. 
In the event of recovery, we must be repaid for all amounts paid out by us plus any related collection expenses. 
We will enforce this provision only in the manner and to the extent permitted under all applicable state laws. 
10. CHANGES 
This policy contains all of the agreements between you and us . Its terms may not be changed or waived except 
by endorsement. 
ASSIGNMENT 
No change of interest In this policy Is effective unless we consenl In writing by mnnns of endorsement to this 
policy. 
If you die. this policy will continue for: 
(a) the surviving spouse if a resident of the same household; 
(b) any legal mnceseniMWe to the extent he is acting within the scope of his duties as such; or 
(c) any person having proper temporary custody of the covered automobile . 
TERMINATION 
You may cancel this policy by returning it to us or by writing and telling us on what future date you wish to stop 
coverage. 
We can cancel this policy by delivering to you or by mailing to you . at your last known address shown on our 
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records, notice stating when the cancellation will be effective. This notice will be mailed to you not less than the 
minimum statutory time permitted by state law, but not less than 10 days, for non-payment of premium, or not 
less than 20 days prior to the effective date of cancellation for underwriting reasons if: 
(a) your driver's license or the license of any other driver who either resides In the same household or cus-
tomarily operates the covered automobile has been suspended or revoked during the 12 month period 
preceding the effective date of cancellation; or 
(b) we discover fraud or material misrepresentation in your obtaining the policy or in your presentation of a 
claim; or 
(c) this policy has been in effect less than 60 days at the time notice of cancellation is mailed. 
If we decide not to renew or continue your policy, we will mail notice to you at the last known address shown on 
our records. 
Notice will be mailed at least 30 days before the end of the policy period. We will have the right not to renew or 
continue only at each anniversary of the original effective date. 
If we offer to renew or continue and you do not accept, this policy will automatically terminate at the end of the 
current policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or continuation premium when due shall mean that you 
have not accepted our offer. 
If you obtain other insurance on your covered automobile . any similar insurance provided by this policy will ter-
minate as to that automobile on the effective date of the other insurance. 
OTHER TERMINATION PROVISIONS 
1. If the law in effect in your state at the time this policy is issued, renewed or continued: 
a. requires a longer notice period; or 
b. requires a special form of or procedure for giving notice; or 
c. modifies any of the stated termination reasons, 
we will comply with those requirements. 
2. Proof of mailing of any notice shall be sufficient proof of notice. 
3. If you cancel, oremium may be computed on a short rate basis. If we cancel, premium shall be computed on 
a pro rata basis. Return premium shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. Any refund may be returned either at 
the time cancellation is effected or as soon as possible after cancellation becomes effective, but refund or 
offer of refund is not a condition of cancellation. 
4. The effective date of cancellation or termination stated in the notice shall become the end of the policy period. 
13. LOSS PAYABLE CLAUSE 
If a loss payee is shown In the Declarations, we may pay any collision or comprehensive loss to: 
(a) you and. if unpaid, the repairer; or 
(b) you and the loss payee, as its interest may appear, when we find it is not practical to repair the covered 
automobile ; or 
(c) the loss payee, as to its interest, if the covered automobile has been repossessed. 
When we pay the toss payee for loss for which you are not covered, we are entitled to the loss payee's right of 
recovery against you to the extent of our payment. Our right of recovery shall not impair the loss payee's right to 
recover the full amount of its claim. 
The coverage for the loss payee's interest only is valid until we terminate it. We will not terminate coverage for this 
interest because of: 
(a) any act or negligence of the owner or borrower; or 
(b) a change In the ownership or interest unknown to us . unless the loss payee knew of it and failed to tell us 
within 10 days; or 
(c) an error in the description of the vehicle. 
The date of termination of the loss payee's interest will be at least 10 days after the date we mail the termination 
notice. 
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14. ARBITRATION 
Arbitration applies to Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Coverage and will take place under the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association, unless other means 
(a) are required by law; or 
(b) are agreed to by the injured party and us . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. METROPOLITAN has caused this policy to be signed by its President and its Secretary at 
Warwick. Rhode Island, and countersigned on the Declarations by a duly authorized representative. In the event that 
the President or Secretary who signed this contract cease to be officers of Metropolitan either before or after the con-
tract is issued, the contract may be issued with the same effect as if they were still officers. 
Secretary 
y 
President 
Primed in U.S.A. 0187 
MPL 7066-000 
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